In response to Brian Fitzpatrick's post "Response to 'Initial Thoughts'" (2/2/2013):
In reply to one of my posts, Brian brought up the concept that value exists on a sliding scale. He suggested that the ability to remember one's past gave one value in addition to the preexisting value generated by one's ability to value oneself. This made me wonder which other qualities can grant value in addition to that basic value shared by all sentient beings (or subjects-of-a-life, to use the lingo).
My initial thoughts included such qualities as the ability to record history (as with written language), a social structure, the ability to create lasting monuments or other physical mementos, and the capacity for rational thought. However, on second glance I wondered if I might be biased. The aforementioned qualities are certainly valuable by a human standard, but since this whole argument began with one's ability to value oneself, is it fair to judge the value of other animals by a human standard? Dolphins, as examples of members of an extremely intelligent nonhuman species, do not typically create lasting structures and do not record their history, yet they are undoubtedly very high on the sliding scale of sentience - irrefutably higher than either beavers or termites, both of which produce rather formidable structures.
I am not sure how to determine, then, which qualities we should give consideration to when deciding how much value to place on any given type of animal. Some, like Brian's suggestion of memory, seem obvious, but others are not so. When there is only a slight difference in attributes between one animal and another, what can allow one to differentiate between the values of the two?
Sunday, February 3, 2013
Q&A 1, Second Answer
My question is: Since Donovan’s argument rests on the assumption
that all humans have and use the capacity to experience sympathy for
non-humans, what would she say about humans who lack that capacity (through a
mental dysfunction or a simple difference in personality?)
I think she would say that those people are dysfunctional, and that their judgement is therefore invalid. This would be consistent with her belief that only one view is possible for those who truly experience sympathy. It also shows what is, perhaps, the greatest problem with her argument - despite her statement that everyone's emotions regarding animals are valid, she goes on to say that if one's emotional response to animals does not match with hers, one is not trying hard enough, or has not encountered the right circumstances.
I think she would say that those people are dysfunctional, and that their judgement is therefore invalid. This would be consistent with her belief that only one view is possible for those who truly experience sympathy. It also shows what is, perhaps, the greatest problem with her argument - despite her statement that everyone's emotions regarding animals are valid, she goes on to say that if one's emotional response to animals does not match with hers, one is not trying hard enough, or has not encountered the right circumstances.
Q&A 1, First Answer
My question is: Does Cohen’s argument lead to the conclusion
that humans who are not fully sentient adults (for example, young children) are
no more valuable than trees?
I think so. If one absolutely must be a moral agent in order to have rights, then neither trees nor young children have rights. This conclusion is obviously troubling. I do not know if Cohen has responded at length to this criticism, but I can hypothesize a few ways he might do so if he chose.
First, he might argue that children have value because they are potential moral agents. The argument from potentiality (more commonly seen in debates on abortion), however, is rife with problems. We cannot know the future, so there is a definite chance that a child will never mature into a moral agent. There is also the possibility that the child will grow into a moral agent who harms many other moral agents, to the point that it would be better if they had never achieved agency. The argument from potentiality is also incompatible with the idea of indirect value, since any thing has the potential to become something a moral agent values; if we accept both arguments, we cannot harm anything in any case, which seems ridiculous. Additionally, potentiality only applies to those children with the potential to become moral agents, meaning that abusing a terminally ill child, a mentally disabled child, or a mentally disabled adult for that matter, is perfectly ethical. Lastly, to borrow from the debate on abortion, we must ask at what point something becomes a potential agent. If a child is a potential moral agent and therefore valuable, does a fetus have the same status, making abortion wrong on the grounds of potential agency? Is a zygote a potential moral agent? Are the as-yet-uncombined sex chromosomes contained inside sexually mature humans potential moral agents, making the use of birth control unethical, and in fact making it morally wrong to do anything but attempt to reproduce as often as possible? This also seems ridiculous, forcing us to conclude that the value of children stems from something other than potentiality.
Second, Cohen could argue that the value of children stems from the sentimental value moral agents place on them. Children tend to engender very strong sentimental attachments from adult humans, giving them quite a lot of value in that way. Yet this argument, too, has flaws. If children obtain value only through the attachment of moral agents, it is not unethical to harm or kill a child for whom no one cares - a street child, perhaps - provided that you ensure no moral agents are harmed by, say, discovering the child's body later on.
I think so. If one absolutely must be a moral agent in order to have rights, then neither trees nor young children have rights. This conclusion is obviously troubling. I do not know if Cohen has responded at length to this criticism, but I can hypothesize a few ways he might do so if he chose.
First, he might argue that children have value because they are potential moral agents. The argument from potentiality (more commonly seen in debates on abortion), however, is rife with problems. We cannot know the future, so there is a definite chance that a child will never mature into a moral agent. There is also the possibility that the child will grow into a moral agent who harms many other moral agents, to the point that it would be better if they had never achieved agency. The argument from potentiality is also incompatible with the idea of indirect value, since any thing has the potential to become something a moral agent values; if we accept both arguments, we cannot harm anything in any case, which seems ridiculous. Additionally, potentiality only applies to those children with the potential to become moral agents, meaning that abusing a terminally ill child, a mentally disabled child, or a mentally disabled adult for that matter, is perfectly ethical. Lastly, to borrow from the debate on abortion, we must ask at what point something becomes a potential agent. If a child is a potential moral agent and therefore valuable, does a fetus have the same status, making abortion wrong on the grounds of potential agency? Is a zygote a potential moral agent? Are the as-yet-uncombined sex chromosomes contained inside sexually mature humans potential moral agents, making the use of birth control unethical, and in fact making it morally wrong to do anything but attempt to reproduce as often as possible? This also seems ridiculous, forcing us to conclude that the value of children stems from something other than potentiality.
Second, Cohen could argue that the value of children stems from the sentimental value moral agents place on them. Children tend to engender very strong sentimental attachments from adult humans, giving them quite a lot of value in that way. Yet this argument, too, has flaws. If children obtain value only through the attachment of moral agents, it is not unethical to harm or kill a child for whom no one cares - a street child, perhaps - provided that you ensure no moral agents are harmed by, say, discovering the child's body later on.
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