What is Harm?

In response to Tyler's post "Love, love, love" (2/11/2013):

While I think that the idea of learning to love oneself and other moral beings through practicing non-violence towards even nonmoral beings has merit, and is certainly interesting, it also brings up a question - what, exactly, is harm?  Obviously in the case of a sentient creature, like a dog, harm is something which causes pain or suffering, but what about in the case of, as Tyler mentions, a robot?  The robot cannot experience pain and cannot suffer.  It can 'malfunction,' but all that means is it can fail to act as it is supposed to, and who is doing that supposing but humans?  If a human decides the function of the robot in the first place, presumably they can later on change that function.  This could occur in a mild form (i.e. the original function is to type on a keyboard, and the later function is to play a piano) or an extreme form (i.e. the original function is to type, but the later one is to make a decorative centerpiece for someone's table after being melted down and smashed up into an interesting shape).  Can anyone decisively say if any of these changes in function are harming the robot?  It cannot itself communicate or experience distress, and it cannot value itself.  All its value stems from outside.  As such, it cannot truly be harmed.

Q&A 3, Answer

My question is: If a person provides conflicting behavioural and linguistic evidence, as in Lynch’s ‘Mary’ example, which evidence is more compelling?

'Actions speak louder than words.'  A lot of people use this saying, but I wonder how many mean it.  It is certainly true some of the time; for example, most people agree that in most if, for example, a child claims not to have eaten a cookie but is covered in crumbs, they are probably lying.  Similarly, although more seriously, if a person is in a relationship with a partner who regularly abuses them and then apologises afterwards but makes no effort to change, they should pay attention to their partner's actions more than their words and leave or get help.

Are there not other situations, though, when people give more weight to words than to actions?  I think so.  If a person is experiencing muscle spasms and breaks a vase, then says that they didn't and don't intend to break anything even as they smash another piece of pottery, one can probably trust their words - especially if one knew previously about their condition, or if they explain during the episode.  In fact, if a person can give a good reason for acting a certain way, I think many people will heed the explanation more than the action.  Some actions are seemingly meaningless without explanations.

As such, I think that neither Lynch nor Carruthers makes a convincing general case with the 'Mary' example.  In order to determine whether one should believe Mary's actions or her words, one would have to know more background information; therefore, that particular example does not serve well to prove a point in either philosopher's favour.