In response to Andrew's post 'Humanely Killing?' (5/5/2013):
In his post, Andrew mentions that one of the few cases in which killing an animal might be justified is if that animal is in chronic pain. This does not seem unreasonable; after all, many countries are now considering the morality of allowing voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide for humans in similar situations. Since animals cannot give their consent to euthanasia, in some cases it might be best to have their human guardians consent on their behalf. Currently, vet's offices euthanise many sick animals every year, ending their suffering in a painless manner akin to falling asleep.
Yet there is a problem with this system as it is currently implemented. There are few to no regulations on 'pet' euthanasia. True, many guardians only bring in their companion animals for this purpose when the animals are clearly in severe pain, and their suffering is not due to a temporary condition, but others may ask for their companion animal to be euthanised for petty or otherwise immoral reasons. Some of the most common are: the guardian is moving to an apartment which will not allow companion animals, the companion animal turned out to be more difficult to care for than the guardian supposed, or someone in the guardian's family (perhaps a new spouse) dislikes or is allergic to the companion animal. These are clearly not good reasons to end the life of a healthy animal! And yet, the decision to euthanise is still left up to subjective human judgement. Veterinarians do have the power to refuse to euthanise an animal, but some veterinarians do not care what they do as long as they are paid for it, and others find themselves in situations where they risk losing their jobs if they refuse to euthanise.
I think that there should be extremely strict laws on companion animal euthanasia - if anything, I think that these laws should be stricter than on voluntary human euthanasia or assisted suicide, since the companion animals themselves cannot consent. I think that these laws should prevent veterinarians from euthanising healthy animals, protect those who refuse to euthanise, and probably also provide measures to remove companion animals from guardians who clearly have little or no concern for their welfare and place them in homes with new, caring guardians.
Wednesday, May 8, 2013
Enforced Morality vs. Natural Morality
In response to Brian's post 'Metaethical Concerns' (5/7/2013):
In his post, Brian mentions the fairly common belief that one must be religious in order to be moral. While he does not agree with this view, he states that it may have a grain of truth, since without an all-powerful authority figure imposing rewards and punishments for good and bad behaviour, why should humans be moral?
To some extent, I can certainly see the point of this argument. The basis of morality may indeed be constructed. Yet statistically speaking, irreligious people are no more likely on an individual basis to commit crimes or act negatively than religious people. On a group or national basis, they are considerably less likely. If religion helps justify morality, why is this so?
I think that there are several reasons. To begin with, not every irreligious person is a critical thinker, and so may not even consider why or why not they should act morally - and since moral behaviour is conducive to the well-being of society as a whole, the 'default' stance is to act morally. Many irreligious people have other systems of ideology, whether political, 'spiritual,' or social, which impose moral systems in a similar manner to religion. I think that only a small percentage of irreligious people look towards philosophy for moral guidance, and of those who do, a number of them probably never investigate metaethics in particular, which is where this problem of basis for morality lies.
The small number who do investigate metaethics, and the smaller number who come to the conclusion that morality rests on a construct, are still more likely to act morally than not. Since humans are social animals, it is programmed into most of us, I think, to act in a way which will contribute to a smoothly functioning society. Therefore, even those people who conclude that they have no objective or exterior reason to act morally will probably act morally anyway. The percentage who do not is so tiny as to not register in large-group statistics.
In his post, Brian mentions the fairly common belief that one must be religious in order to be moral. While he does not agree with this view, he states that it may have a grain of truth, since without an all-powerful authority figure imposing rewards and punishments for good and bad behaviour, why should humans be moral?
To some extent, I can certainly see the point of this argument. The basis of morality may indeed be constructed. Yet statistically speaking, irreligious people are no more likely on an individual basis to commit crimes or act negatively than religious people. On a group or national basis, they are considerably less likely. If religion helps justify morality, why is this so?
I think that there are several reasons. To begin with, not every irreligious person is a critical thinker, and so may not even consider why or why not they should act morally - and since moral behaviour is conducive to the well-being of society as a whole, the 'default' stance is to act morally. Many irreligious people have other systems of ideology, whether political, 'spiritual,' or social, which impose moral systems in a similar manner to religion. I think that only a small percentage of irreligious people look towards philosophy for moral guidance, and of those who do, a number of them probably never investigate metaethics in particular, which is where this problem of basis for morality lies.
The small number who do investigate metaethics, and the smaller number who come to the conclusion that morality rests on a construct, are still more likely to act morally than not. Since humans are social animals, it is programmed into most of us, I think, to act in a way which will contribute to a smoothly functioning society. Therefore, even those people who conclude that they have no objective or exterior reason to act morally will probably act morally anyway. The percentage who do not is so tiny as to not register in large-group statistics.
Final Essay!
Well, here is the final draft of my essay. Any comments would be most welcome!
Vegetarianism
is morally obligatory for most humans because all sentient entities have at
least two basic rights: the right to life and the right to freedom from harm. These rights stem from sentient beings’
abilities to consciously value themselves and to suffer.
The
capacity to consciously value oneself, and one’s continued existence, is the
most basic and reliable source of value because it relies only on internal
factors. Externally generated valuing
also contributes to the moral relevance of a being (for example, while one can
normally kill a human or a dog who, due to some injury or disease, exists in a
permanently vegetative state without violating moral principles, one cannot
morally kill that individual if others place value on their life), but even in
its absence, internally generated value usually remains.
No valid reason to seriously doubt that many
non-human animals are conscious exists. Like
humans, non-humans animals adapt to different situations, develop and achieve
apparent goals, and visibly react to pain.
Humans possess no brain structures specific to their species which could
feasibly grant them, uniquely, consciousness.
Frey’s argument from language does not prohibit the possibility of
non-humans having beliefs, desires, and interests; possessing those things
makes language acquisition possible, not the other way around. Otherwise, human infants could never learn
language.
Since they have
consciousness, animals can value themselves and their own well-being, and they
seem to do so. They make efforts to
avoid pain and death while pursuing pleasure and health. As with consciousness, assuming that animals
act in these ways for a different set of reasons than humans defies common
sense. If animals do value themselves,
they have the rights to life and freedom from suffering.
Some advocates against
vegetarianism state that since humans have a right to pursue happiness, and eating
meat makes many humans happy, vegetarianism cannot be morally obligatory;
however, ‘meat’ animals’ right to life usually supersedes humans’ right to
pursue happiness in that particular way.
One can no more ethically derive enjoyment from a non-human animal’s
death than from murdering an innocent human.
Similarly, the right to freedom of choice and the right to continue
cultural traditions (which often include meat-eating) fail to override more
important rights. Most rights rely on
the prior existence of the right to life, and the right to life takes
precedence over them.
Depending on its manner of
implementation, a mass transition to vegetarianism could cause or contribute to
economic disaster for many countries. However, if a populace transitions gradually, it
does not have to do so. Even if it did, countries
would still be able to feed their citizens because plants are a much more
efficient source of food than animals.
The economic disaster would cause inconvenience but not mass death, and avoiding
inconvenience cannot justify eating animals.
Some people reject vegetarianism because
they believe plants and animals have the same rights. This view usually rests on one of two flawed
assumptions, however. The first states
that rights stem from the possession of life.
As I state in the above paragraphs, rights stem from the capacity to
value oneself. The second states that
plants are sentient. While plants, in
spite of the current total lack of evidence, might potentially possess
consciousness to some degree, animals almost certainly do; and since humans
must eat to survive, they should choose the lesser of two evils (or an evil and
a morally neutral action) and consume plants.
In the first paragraph of this
essay, I stated that most, not all, humans should adopt vegetarianism. If a human can only obtain certain nutrients
from meat due to some medical condition preventing absorption from other
sources, the right to self-defense allows them to consume meat. They may also maintain an omnivorous
lifestyle if they live in a location or situation where they can obtain no
other sources of necessary nutrition (as in many so-called ‘third world’
countries) or if they have allergies and intolerances – serious ones, not simply
inconveniences – which prohibit them from consuming other sources of nutrition.
I think that the arguments I
present above lead to the conclusion that vegetarianism is morally
obligatory. Furthermore, I think that
they extend, with only slight modification, to the conclusion that veganism is
morally obligatory. Only the right to
self-defense can mitigate these obligations, and that right applies in very few
cases.
Sunday, May 5, 2013
Leading by Example
In response to Andy's post 'The Final Count Down' (4/29/2013):
One point which Andy's post brings up is that some people are not terribly well-suited to be activists, simply due to personality.
I think this is true, but I do not think that this means such people are unimportant in the field of activism, even if they are not activists themselves. Leading by example can do just as much as, if not more than, vocally advocating for a cause. Clearly, doing both is ideal, but if a person can do just one, I am at least slightly inclined to say that they should lead by example.
If a meat-eater who has no medical or otherwise valid moral reason not to become vegetarian or vegan advocates for vegetarianism or veganism, they will likely have great difficulty convincing people to listen to them. Hypocrisy, while not actually relevant to an argument from logic, nevertheless has a large emotional impact on many people. For example, Peter Singer's argument that everyone should donate as large a portion of their income as possible to poverty relief would probably have a larger following if he donated such a percentage himself. Philosophers, logicians, and some others may consistently differentiate between the argument and the individual making it, but the populace as a whole does not, so a hypocritical advocate for animal rights is unlikely to make much of an impact.
In contrast, a non-activist vegetarian or vegan may end up inadvertently convincing others to adopt their viewpoint. Since they are not adopting a directly aggressive stance, as many activists do, people will feel less inclined to defend themselves mindlessly, and may actually think about the non-activist's points. They may also feel less intimidated, and be therefore more likely to ask questions. If a vegetarian or vegan explains, upon request, their reasoning for adopting their diet, meat-eaters may consider their arguments later on, and perhaps be persuaded.
I do still think that the ideal position for a supporter of animal rights to take is one of both activism and personal action. I am opposed to the idea of violent, or even especially aggressive, activism, because the first misses the entire point and I don't think that the second is effective. Instead, I support rational, civil activism, wherein one uses reasoned and polite arguments to attempt to sway others to one's cause. One does not insult them or lean overly much on emotionally charged arguments, although some use of emotions or even care ethics may be justified.
One point which Andy's post brings up is that some people are not terribly well-suited to be activists, simply due to personality.
I think this is true, but I do not think that this means such people are unimportant in the field of activism, even if they are not activists themselves. Leading by example can do just as much as, if not more than, vocally advocating for a cause. Clearly, doing both is ideal, but if a person can do just one, I am at least slightly inclined to say that they should lead by example.
If a meat-eater who has no medical or otherwise valid moral reason not to become vegetarian or vegan advocates for vegetarianism or veganism, they will likely have great difficulty convincing people to listen to them. Hypocrisy, while not actually relevant to an argument from logic, nevertheless has a large emotional impact on many people. For example, Peter Singer's argument that everyone should donate as large a portion of their income as possible to poverty relief would probably have a larger following if he donated such a percentage himself. Philosophers, logicians, and some others may consistently differentiate between the argument and the individual making it, but the populace as a whole does not, so a hypocritical advocate for animal rights is unlikely to make much of an impact.
In contrast, a non-activist vegetarian or vegan may end up inadvertently convincing others to adopt their viewpoint. Since they are not adopting a directly aggressive stance, as many activists do, people will feel less inclined to defend themselves mindlessly, and may actually think about the non-activist's points. They may also feel less intimidated, and be therefore more likely to ask questions. If a vegetarian or vegan explains, upon request, their reasoning for adopting their diet, meat-eaters may consider their arguments later on, and perhaps be persuaded.
I do still think that the ideal position for a supporter of animal rights to take is one of both activism and personal action. I am opposed to the idea of violent, or even especially aggressive, activism, because the first misses the entire point and I don't think that the second is effective. Instead, I support rational, civil activism, wherein one uses reasoned and polite arguments to attempt to sway others to one's cause. One does not insult them or lean overly much on emotionally charged arguments, although some use of emotions or even care ethics may be justified.
Hindsight is Sometimes Unpleasant
In response to Sebastian's post 'Animals in the Future' (5/28/2013):
In his post, Sebastian wonders whether humanity, in the future, will ever look back at the current treatment of animals with the same attitude that humanity today looks back at sexism or slavery.
I think it is certainly possible! However, I think that it will take longer than the movements against sexism and slavery took to (mostly) disappear. This is because it is more widespread, older, and based on larger differences than either of those movements.
Sexism has been around for a while, certainly, but probably not since before civilisation began. It is based on (sometimes) visible differences in sex and on differences in gender, but that is it. Everyone involved in sexism, whether those benefiting from, those perpetuating, or those suffering from it, is human. Furthermore, not all nations on earth are or have been sexist.
Slavery has also been around for a while, but certainly not since before civilisation began. Not all nations on earth have endorsed it at any point. It is usually based either on birth, which is entirely arbitrary and impossible to detect in and of itself, on victory or defeat in war, which is entirely changeable and relates to what has happened to a person, not who they are, or on skin colour, which is a purely phenotypical difference even less important than gender. Again, everyone involved in it in any capacity is human
Bad treatment of animals is almost worldwide in range (even primarily vegetarian/vegan countries, like India, still endorse other types of mistreatment), has been around since before the rise of civilisation (humanity evolved as an omnivorous species), and is based on fairly significant differences in appearance and capacity. The latter is not true in the cases of sexism and slavery. As such, while I am optimistic about the potential for human society to eventually move past its horrific maltreatment of animals, I am not under any illusions that we will look back on current practices with disgust any time soon.
In his post, Sebastian wonders whether humanity, in the future, will ever look back at the current treatment of animals with the same attitude that humanity today looks back at sexism or slavery.
I think it is certainly possible! However, I think that it will take longer than the movements against sexism and slavery took to (mostly) disappear. This is because it is more widespread, older, and based on larger differences than either of those movements.
Sexism has been around for a while, certainly, but probably not since before civilisation began. It is based on (sometimes) visible differences in sex and on differences in gender, but that is it. Everyone involved in sexism, whether those benefiting from, those perpetuating, or those suffering from it, is human. Furthermore, not all nations on earth are or have been sexist.
Slavery has also been around for a while, but certainly not since before civilisation began. Not all nations on earth have endorsed it at any point. It is usually based either on birth, which is entirely arbitrary and impossible to detect in and of itself, on victory or defeat in war, which is entirely changeable and relates to what has happened to a person, not who they are, or on skin colour, which is a purely phenotypical difference even less important than gender. Again, everyone involved in it in any capacity is human
Bad treatment of animals is almost worldwide in range (even primarily vegetarian/vegan countries, like India, still endorse other types of mistreatment), has been around since before the rise of civilisation (humanity evolved as an omnivorous species), and is based on fairly significant differences in appearance and capacity. The latter is not true in the cases of sexism and slavery. As such, while I am optimistic about the potential for human society to eventually move past its horrific maltreatment of animals, I am not under any illusions that we will look back on current practices with disgust any time soon.
New Perspective On History
I was recently thinking about the fact that society does not just make it more difficult for people to be vegetarian or vegan, it sometimes makes it impossible.
For example, MCLA's mandatory meal plan makes it impossible for a person to be vegan without eating nuts or soy (nut allergies are common, as is soy intolerance), without paying for food in addition to the meal plan (which is insanely expensive) and while still getting adequate nutrition until senior year, at which point the meal plan is no longer mandatory. At first I just viewed this as a simple societal prejudice, regrettable but not terrible, but upon thinking further, I realised that it is much more than that. By not providing vegan options, and then demanding that all MCLA students who are not seniors pay ridiculous amounts to eat only Aramark food, MCLA is effectively forcing students to engage in immoral behaviour. The only way to avoid this is to get a doctor's note (which many doctors will not provide) or drop out of school. The latter option, while more moral in the short run, may end up causing more harm in the long run, since it is far more possible to influence society, and other people, from a position of societal significance such as that a college education can help afford.
Now, perhaps the students are not being immoral as such, since ought implies can, and they cannot safely consume a vegan diet while in their first three years at MCLA. But certainly there is some sort of immorality going on, whether on the part of Aramark inc. or MCLA, or both. This kind of situation is not unique to MCLA, either; many other colleges have the same problem, as do numerous other kinds of institution. I must imagine that it is difficult to be vegan, or perhaps even vegetarian, in prison. It is certainly difficult, often impossible, to do so when homeless or otherwise reliant on soup kitchens/free church food/similar things - often, these organisations only offer one or two food options, and most of the time they contain meat (or, at the very least, eggs and dairy). Thus, society immorally forces a meat-eating diet on a substantial number of people. This is immoral for two reasons: one, it deprives people of their right to choose their diet, and may cause many psychological harm by their knowledge that they are eating dead animals, which they would not otherwise choose to eat, and two, it causes the death and suffering of innumerable non-human animals.
This made me wonder about the past, and the various institutional evils present at different periods therein. Often, when we look back at the past, we blame people for not taking a stand against immoral practices, like sexism or slavery. We seem to assume that they are choosing to be lazy, that they could act morally if they simply chose to do so and would put in a bit of effort. Even if we acknowledge that it would be difficult, we certainly don't deny that it is possible. Yet is this always the case? In past America, if one was a slave owner, would freeing all of one's slaves actually have caused any good? Or would the formally enslaved people simply be re-captured and forced back into slavery, perhaps under worse conditions than before? I don't know the answers to those sorts of questions. Yet, being in a position of forced immorality myself, I must look back on people of the past with a more analytical eye, rather than immediately dismissing their actions as the results of lazy conformity.
For example, MCLA's mandatory meal plan makes it impossible for a person to be vegan without eating nuts or soy (nut allergies are common, as is soy intolerance), without paying for food in addition to the meal plan (which is insanely expensive) and while still getting adequate nutrition until senior year, at which point the meal plan is no longer mandatory. At first I just viewed this as a simple societal prejudice, regrettable but not terrible, but upon thinking further, I realised that it is much more than that. By not providing vegan options, and then demanding that all MCLA students who are not seniors pay ridiculous amounts to eat only Aramark food, MCLA is effectively forcing students to engage in immoral behaviour. The only way to avoid this is to get a doctor's note (which many doctors will not provide) or drop out of school. The latter option, while more moral in the short run, may end up causing more harm in the long run, since it is far more possible to influence society, and other people, from a position of societal significance such as that a college education can help afford.
Now, perhaps the students are not being immoral as such, since ought implies can, and they cannot safely consume a vegan diet while in their first three years at MCLA. But certainly there is some sort of immorality going on, whether on the part of Aramark inc. or MCLA, or both. This kind of situation is not unique to MCLA, either; many other colleges have the same problem, as do numerous other kinds of institution. I must imagine that it is difficult to be vegan, or perhaps even vegetarian, in prison. It is certainly difficult, often impossible, to do so when homeless or otherwise reliant on soup kitchens/free church food/similar things - often, these organisations only offer one or two food options, and most of the time they contain meat (or, at the very least, eggs and dairy). Thus, society immorally forces a meat-eating diet on a substantial number of people. This is immoral for two reasons: one, it deprives people of their right to choose their diet, and may cause many psychological harm by their knowledge that they are eating dead animals, which they would not otherwise choose to eat, and two, it causes the death and suffering of innumerable non-human animals.
This made me wonder about the past, and the various institutional evils present at different periods therein. Often, when we look back at the past, we blame people for not taking a stand against immoral practices, like sexism or slavery. We seem to assume that they are choosing to be lazy, that they could act morally if they simply chose to do so and would put in a bit of effort. Even if we acknowledge that it would be difficult, we certainly don't deny that it is possible. Yet is this always the case? In past America, if one was a slave owner, would freeing all of one's slaves actually have caused any good? Or would the formally enslaved people simply be re-captured and forced back into slavery, perhaps under worse conditions than before? I don't know the answers to those sorts of questions. Yet, being in a position of forced immorality myself, I must look back on people of the past with a more analytical eye, rather than immediately dismissing their actions as the results of lazy conformity.
Sunday, April 28, 2013
Q&A 9, Second Answer
My question is: Francione claims that even animals living in
‘humane,’ small farms, for purposes other than meat production, are
tortured. Is this true?
I think that in many, perhaps most, cases it is not. However, some animals may be genetically modified to the point that they are in chronic pain regardless of their conditions. Furthermore, no matter how well farmers treat the animals living on their farms, if they procure animals from large corporations they are still causing suffering, since most corporations treat animals as disposable commodities and kill many animals or let them die due to poor conditions.
Depending on the type of animal, some farm inhabitants may suffer due to confinement, even in large areas. While most farm animals, such as cows, chickens, or pigs, do not require huge amounts of space, more unusual animals may.
I think that in many, perhaps most, cases it is not. However, some animals may be genetically modified to the point that they are in chronic pain regardless of their conditions. Furthermore, no matter how well farmers treat the animals living on their farms, if they procure animals from large corporations they are still causing suffering, since most corporations treat animals as disposable commodities and kill many animals or let them die due to poor conditions.
Depending on the type of animal, some farm inhabitants may suffer due to confinement, even in large areas. While most farm animals, such as cows, chickens, or pigs, do not require huge amounts of space, more unusual animals may.
Level of Relevancy
In response to Sebastian's post 'What gives animals Legal Rights?' (4/21/2013):
While I agree that autonomy alone is not a valid basis for deciding which animals have which rights, I think that it does have some place in the list of factors. If a being is not autonomous, then it may actually benefit from being controlled in some way or ways, and probably does not have a sense of liberty versus oppression. At the end of the post I am replying to, Sebastian suggested that autonomy is no more morally relevant than race, gender, or age - the first two are most certainly morally irrelevant, but the last is not, and may provide a helpful comparison.
Children are not typically able to survive without the aid of adults, and so the law gives them certain rights that adults do not have - for example, the right to be cared for. For the same reasons, they are deprived of other rights, such as the right to vote. The rationale for this is that if children possessed those rights, it would harm either the children themselves, the society as a whole, or something else of value. The basis upon which this distinction between children and adults rests is composed of many different factors, only one of which is age. If the only difference between children and adults was their age, and the experience which comes with it, there would be far less justification for granting them different legal rights.
Similarly, I think that autonomy plays an important part in determining which rights belong to which animals. So do intelligence level, social or solo nature, longevity, physical features, and many other factors. I do not think that one factor alone can provide a morally relevant distinction between any two categories of being.
While I agree that autonomy alone is not a valid basis for deciding which animals have which rights, I think that it does have some place in the list of factors. If a being is not autonomous, then it may actually benefit from being controlled in some way or ways, and probably does not have a sense of liberty versus oppression. At the end of the post I am replying to, Sebastian suggested that autonomy is no more morally relevant than race, gender, or age - the first two are most certainly morally irrelevant, but the last is not, and may provide a helpful comparison.
Children are not typically able to survive without the aid of adults, and so the law gives them certain rights that adults do not have - for example, the right to be cared for. For the same reasons, they are deprived of other rights, such as the right to vote. The rationale for this is that if children possessed those rights, it would harm either the children themselves, the society as a whole, or something else of value. The basis upon which this distinction between children and adults rests is composed of many different factors, only one of which is age. If the only difference between children and adults was their age, and the experience which comes with it, there would be far less justification for granting them different legal rights.
Similarly, I think that autonomy plays an important part in determining which rights belong to which animals. So do intelligence level, social or solo nature, longevity, physical features, and many other factors. I do not think that one factor alone can provide a morally relevant distinction between any two categories of being.
Sunday, April 21, 2013
Utilising Corpses and the Problem of Consent
In response to Kurt's post 'Immortalized: Animals As Art' (4/21/2013):
The concept of rights-after-death is a fascinating one, especially where it pertains to the physical remains of the deceased. Certainly, the law recognises such rights, in the forms of wills, inheritance laws, funeral plans, and legal restrictions on what one can do with dead human bodies. However, the wishes of the dead appear to be, legally speaking, of less import than the wishes of the living. For example, the legal penalty for rape in the USA is typically about eight or nine years in prison, whereas the penalty for necrophilia is often only three or so years. Some states actually have no laws against necrophilia at all. Clearly, the law recognises a large difference in the amount of importance of getting consent in these two instances.
Nevertheless, wishes still do evidently matter quite a lot after death - most of the objections I have heard against necrophilia (yes, I have discussed it with people - one never knows what will come up in conversation when one is a political enthusiast and philosopher!) centre around the idea that the former owner of the corpse involved did not consent to the act. So it is not the odd or disrespectful use of the body which matters here. Further evidence is in the legal use of donor bodies for display after plastination, which might be considered extremely odd or disrespectful - bodies sliced into pieces, presented in strange poses, with their inner workings exposed. The important part is in the deceased party's consent. Indeed, I believe it is quite legal to preserve a human body through taxidermy after death, provided that body's owner previously consented to the use.
Non-human animals currently have no legal rights over their remains. How much should they have? They cannot legally consent to anything, so should the default action be assuming that they would give no consent? It is easy to say so in the case of something like eccentric taxidermy 'art,' but what about in the case of scientific study? The animal sustains no harm from its body's use, so there would seem to be no objection, but in that case why not use the body for 'art?' For that matter, why not use human bodies for 'art' also? I am not yet sure what are the relevant differences between these situations, if indeed there are any. Thoughts?
The concept of rights-after-death is a fascinating one, especially where it pertains to the physical remains of the deceased. Certainly, the law recognises such rights, in the forms of wills, inheritance laws, funeral plans, and legal restrictions on what one can do with dead human bodies. However, the wishes of the dead appear to be, legally speaking, of less import than the wishes of the living. For example, the legal penalty for rape in the USA is typically about eight or nine years in prison, whereas the penalty for necrophilia is often only three or so years. Some states actually have no laws against necrophilia at all. Clearly, the law recognises a large difference in the amount of importance of getting consent in these two instances.
Nevertheless, wishes still do evidently matter quite a lot after death - most of the objections I have heard against necrophilia (yes, I have discussed it with people - one never knows what will come up in conversation when one is a political enthusiast and philosopher!) centre around the idea that the former owner of the corpse involved did not consent to the act. So it is not the odd or disrespectful use of the body which matters here. Further evidence is in the legal use of donor bodies for display after plastination, which might be considered extremely odd or disrespectful - bodies sliced into pieces, presented in strange poses, with their inner workings exposed. The important part is in the deceased party's consent. Indeed, I believe it is quite legal to preserve a human body through taxidermy after death, provided that body's owner previously consented to the use.
Non-human animals currently have no legal rights over their remains. How much should they have? They cannot legally consent to anything, so should the default action be assuming that they would give no consent? It is easy to say so in the case of something like eccentric taxidermy 'art,' but what about in the case of scientific study? The animal sustains no harm from its body's use, so there would seem to be no objection, but in that case why not use the body for 'art?' For that matter, why not use human bodies for 'art' also? I am not yet sure what are the relevant differences between these situations, if indeed there are any. Thoughts?
Q&A 9, Answer
My question is: What might a list of animal rights include?
Well, I think that ideally there would be more than one list, since animals are very different from one another and have different needs, which merit different legal rights. A dolphin, for example, is highly intelligent and requires very careful treatment, whereas a trout is less intelligent. While one should still afford the trout a certain amount of respect, certain things that one can ethically do to it one could not ethically do to the dolphin - for example, one could curse at the trout without fear of harming it in any way, but the dolphin might pick up on one's attitude or the tone of one's voice while cursing, and so could sustain psychological or emotional harm.
A basic list of rights, however, could probably apply to all animals at or above a certain level of awareness, supplemented by additional rights in many cases. The basic list, I believe, would include the right to life; the right to freedom from physical or psychological abuse (at least in the cases where psychological abuse could actually occur); the right to food, water, shelter, and other necessities of survival in a sufficient quantity to satisfy the animal, rather than simply help it stay alive; the right to companionship if it is a social animal; and probably other things also. These are the only ones I can think of right now. If anyone else has ideas for what such a basic list should include, by all means, contribute them.
Well, I think that ideally there would be more than one list, since animals are very different from one another and have different needs, which merit different legal rights. A dolphin, for example, is highly intelligent and requires very careful treatment, whereas a trout is less intelligent. While one should still afford the trout a certain amount of respect, certain things that one can ethically do to it one could not ethically do to the dolphin - for example, one could curse at the trout without fear of harming it in any way, but the dolphin might pick up on one's attitude or the tone of one's voice while cursing, and so could sustain psychological or emotional harm.
A basic list of rights, however, could probably apply to all animals at or above a certain level of awareness, supplemented by additional rights in many cases. The basic list, I believe, would include the right to life; the right to freedom from physical or psychological abuse (at least in the cases where psychological abuse could actually occur); the right to food, water, shelter, and other necessities of survival in a sufficient quantity to satisfy the animal, rather than simply help it stay alive; the right to companionship if it is a social animal; and probably other things also. These are the only ones I can think of right now. If anyone else has ideas for what such a basic list should include, by all means, contribute them.
Sunday, April 14, 2013
Q&A 8, Answer
My question is: What are some situations in which a
human would not benefit from a relationship with a companion animal?
I think there are many such situations. Firstly, a human could simply be allergic to a particular species of animal, and so would be harmed or at least inconvenienced by a relationship with a companion of that species. Someone could also have had a traumatic experience with a type of animal, and so could have PTSD-like symptoms when exposed to animals of that type. Someone could also simply dislike some of the personality traits typically found within one species of animal, and so would be unlikely to find a fulfilling relationship with a member of that species.
This last point brings up an issue, however, that I have been thinking about. It is clear enough that different humans have radically different personalities. It is further clear that many non-human animals are quite capable of having individual personalities - one cat may be almost nothing like another. Thus, why is it that people consistently stereotype species? 'Cats are aloof.' 'Dogs are loyal.' It may be true that most cats, at least when compared to other types of animal, are aloof; yet this is hardly true of all cats. I lived for several years with a cat who would routinely crawl up my chest as I read a book and shove her nose into my eyes until I scratched her behind the ears. She would also lie around near people, and if no one had associated with her for a while, she would walk about meowing mournfully until someone picked her up or played with her. It is no more true that all dogs are loyal. Most dogs are probably loyal, but some are actually quite aloof, or will wander off and not return - while I have not personally known any dogs who did this, I have known people who have lost dogs in just this way.
So, with all these individual personalities, non-humans are not much easier to generalise about accurately than humans. Is it some sort of 'ism' which causes us to stereotype them like this?
I think there are many such situations. Firstly, a human could simply be allergic to a particular species of animal, and so would be harmed or at least inconvenienced by a relationship with a companion of that species. Someone could also have had a traumatic experience with a type of animal, and so could have PTSD-like symptoms when exposed to animals of that type. Someone could also simply dislike some of the personality traits typically found within one species of animal, and so would be unlikely to find a fulfilling relationship with a member of that species.
This last point brings up an issue, however, that I have been thinking about. It is clear enough that different humans have radically different personalities. It is further clear that many non-human animals are quite capable of having individual personalities - one cat may be almost nothing like another. Thus, why is it that people consistently stereotype species? 'Cats are aloof.' 'Dogs are loyal.' It may be true that most cats, at least when compared to other types of animal, are aloof; yet this is hardly true of all cats. I lived for several years with a cat who would routinely crawl up my chest as I read a book and shove her nose into my eyes until I scratched her behind the ears. She would also lie around near people, and if no one had associated with her for a while, she would walk about meowing mournfully until someone picked her up or played with her. It is no more true that all dogs are loyal. Most dogs are probably loyal, but some are actually quite aloof, or will wander off and not return - while I have not personally known any dogs who did this, I have known people who have lost dogs in just this way.
So, with all these individual personalities, non-humans are not much easier to generalise about accurately than humans. Is it some sort of 'ism' which causes us to stereotype them like this?
Mirrors
In response to Perri's post 'Difference Between Zoos and Aquariums' (4/7/2013):
I completely agree that water-dwelling animals are far less appealing to the majority of humans than land animals, and elicit less empathy and sympathy. This is, indeed, very unfortunate, considering the intelligence and often social nature of many water-dwelling animals, particularly cetaceans and octopi. I think that it is the seemingly alien nature of these creatures which causes the mental and emotional distance that many humans seem to feel towards them. Furthermore, I think that this distinction applies between different species of land animal as well.
Dogs and cats appeal to many people; even if a human does not like dogs or cats in general, they may concede that these animals have at least some moral value, or are sentient and somewhat intelligent. This frequently extends to wild cats as well, and wild canines. To a lesser extent, it applies to many other species of mammal.
Yet birds do not receive such a sympathetic attitude at all. In fact, the way in which many people view birds is quite comparable to the way in which they view most sea life - as primarily decorative, without much intelligence or ability to feel emotions. Quite apart from the fact that not all sea life fits this description (although, to be fair, many of the small fish people commonly keep as pets/companions are unintelligent), many birds are actually far more intelligent than the average cat or canine. Some estimates suggest that certain species of parrot have roughly the same mental capacity as six-year-old human children. Birds can also form lasting, deeply emotional bonds with other birds and with non-bird animals as well, including humans - when a parrot says 'I love you,' the bird may actually mean it! Yet humans continue to purchase colourful parrots on a whim, keep them in undersized cages, and provide them with no social interaction whatsoever. I think that this is likely because parrots, like sea-dwelling animals, are less similar to humans than are mammals. Reptiles, amphibians, and insects also fall victim to this alienation, although it may be more commonly justified in their cases.
Overall, I think that this attitude can be traced back to the same essential source as racism can - these creatures, human or not, do not look like me - therefore, they cannot be like me in any important sense. And I think that it is nearly as unjustified in both cases.
I completely agree that water-dwelling animals are far less appealing to the majority of humans than land animals, and elicit less empathy and sympathy. This is, indeed, very unfortunate, considering the intelligence and often social nature of many water-dwelling animals, particularly cetaceans and octopi. I think that it is the seemingly alien nature of these creatures which causes the mental and emotional distance that many humans seem to feel towards them. Furthermore, I think that this distinction applies between different species of land animal as well.
Dogs and cats appeal to many people; even if a human does not like dogs or cats in general, they may concede that these animals have at least some moral value, or are sentient and somewhat intelligent. This frequently extends to wild cats as well, and wild canines. To a lesser extent, it applies to many other species of mammal.
Yet birds do not receive such a sympathetic attitude at all. In fact, the way in which many people view birds is quite comparable to the way in which they view most sea life - as primarily decorative, without much intelligence or ability to feel emotions. Quite apart from the fact that not all sea life fits this description (although, to be fair, many of the small fish people commonly keep as pets/companions are unintelligent), many birds are actually far more intelligent than the average cat or canine. Some estimates suggest that certain species of parrot have roughly the same mental capacity as six-year-old human children. Birds can also form lasting, deeply emotional bonds with other birds and with non-bird animals as well, including humans - when a parrot says 'I love you,' the bird may actually mean it! Yet humans continue to purchase colourful parrots on a whim, keep them in undersized cages, and provide them with no social interaction whatsoever. I think that this is likely because parrots, like sea-dwelling animals, are less similar to humans than are mammals. Reptiles, amphibians, and insects also fall victim to this alienation, although it may be more commonly justified in their cases.
Overall, I think that this attitude can be traced back to the same essential source as racism can - these creatures, human or not, do not look like me - therefore, they cannot be like me in any important sense. And I think that it is nearly as unjustified in both cases.
Sunday, April 7, 2013
Q&A 7, Answer
My question is: Is the focus that Jamieson's and the Defence of Zoos articles place on benefits (as they outweigh, or fail to outweigh, the harms) of
zoos the right path to take in this discussion, or would a focus on the level
of harm be more productive? How much
harm do zoo animals sustain from captivity independent of any other factors
(such as abuse or obviously improper facilities)?
I think that such a focus would be much more productive. Both articles seem to be assuming, right from the start, that they know that amount of harm caused by confining animals in zoos - and I think that they assume different levels of harm. This makes it difficult to set them directly against one another, since they are actually working off of different baselines. Before one can begin to determine whether it is just to hold animals in zoos, one must determine how much harm doing so causes, since that determines, in turn, how much justification, if any, is necessary. If imprisoning animals in zoos causes severe and irreparable harm to them, then I think it is extremely likely that no justifications for the existence of zoos exist. If, however, zoos cause relatively little harm, or no harm at all, to their animal occupants, then little if any justification is necessary.
As for the second portion of my question, I think that it varies extremely widely depending on the animal. Jellyfish, crickets, and beta fish probably sustain essentially no harm from being confined. In fact, the latter two may benefit from it. They are protected from predators, and their environments, while smaller, are still more than big enough for the range of movement they usually prefer. I do not know if I can legitimately say that jellyfish benefit from confinement, since I am not sure that jellyfish are sentient at all, and as such whether they can benefit from anything.
Humpback whales, caribou, and geese, on the other hand, may be seriously harmed by confinement. These animals are migratory, and as such have a very large range in their natural environments. I am not sure how much the limiting of range affects them (geese, for example, may migrate purely out of practicality and as such derive no harm from the removal of the ability and necessity to migrate, although I am far from certain of that. Humpback whales are quite a different story. They usually travel in groups, and many aquariums and zoos deprive them of that state, since whales are very large and a full group might not fit in any tanks the institutions possess. Furthermore, I would guess that they do, to at least some extent, value their ability to migrate and move about over a great area. Thus, confining them probably causes them great harm, and so is almost definitely unjustified.
I think that such a focus would be much more productive. Both articles seem to be assuming, right from the start, that they know that amount of harm caused by confining animals in zoos - and I think that they assume different levels of harm. This makes it difficult to set them directly against one another, since they are actually working off of different baselines. Before one can begin to determine whether it is just to hold animals in zoos, one must determine how much harm doing so causes, since that determines, in turn, how much justification, if any, is necessary. If imprisoning animals in zoos causes severe and irreparable harm to them, then I think it is extremely likely that no justifications for the existence of zoos exist. If, however, zoos cause relatively little harm, or no harm at all, to their animal occupants, then little if any justification is necessary.
As for the second portion of my question, I think that it varies extremely widely depending on the animal. Jellyfish, crickets, and beta fish probably sustain essentially no harm from being confined. In fact, the latter two may benefit from it. They are protected from predators, and their environments, while smaller, are still more than big enough for the range of movement they usually prefer. I do not know if I can legitimately say that jellyfish benefit from confinement, since I am not sure that jellyfish are sentient at all, and as such whether they can benefit from anything.
Humpback whales, caribou, and geese, on the other hand, may be seriously harmed by confinement. These animals are migratory, and as such have a very large range in their natural environments. I am not sure how much the limiting of range affects them (geese, for example, may migrate purely out of practicality and as such derive no harm from the removal of the ability and necessity to migrate, although I am far from certain of that. Humpback whales are quite a different story. They usually travel in groups, and many aquariums and zoos deprive them of that state, since whales are very large and a full group might not fit in any tanks the institutions possess. Furthermore, I would guess that they do, to at least some extent, value their ability to migrate and move about over a great area. Thus, confining them probably causes them great harm, and so is almost definitely unjustified.
Dangers of Assumption and Indiscretion
In response to Sean Edwards' post 'Losing Touch?' (4/5/2013):
Sean brings up an interesting point in his post - the idea that sometimes, hypothetical situations in philosophical discussions become so absurd that they both cause debaters to lose touch with reality, and draw criticism to the entire discipline of philosophy. Such hypotheticals may attempt to chase pure logic so far that they toss aside instinct, emotion, and social norms quite heedlessly.
I think that Sean makes a good point, but I do not think we should cease investigating a subject when it begins to appear bizarre. Instead, perhaps more discretion is wise when discussing very controversial issues, at least until philosophers reach a firm conclusion. It is certainly true that, if many people heard many of the strange and fantastic debates that some philosophers engage in, their faith in philosophy (assuming they had any) would be shaken, and might disappear. However, while this might be cause for discretion, it is not at all cause for cessation of the debates! In fact, ceasing the debates would be at least as dangerous as indiscretion.
This is because, often, even strongly held social norms are wrong. Sean presents an example of a bizarre-sounding hypothetical discussion in his post: that of a case wherein one must either kill a wolf to save a child that the wolf is about to eat, or let the wolf devour the child. He states that any decent person would certainly take the first option, and that the second is repugnant regardless of what logic might say. While I will not disagree with this first statement (especially since I was not present for the aforementioned discussion, and so am not aware of its fine points), I vehemently reject the second. Logic is, I firmly believe, more relevant to moral discussion than social norms or emotion. What if this discussion had occurred one hundred and fifty years ago, and the question was whether it was right to kill a dark-skinned person to save a light-skinned one. Setting aside other factors, such as whether one of the people in question was attempting to harm the other, or whether they were of different ages or familial relation to the debater, I think that many (if not most) light-skinned people would have said it was ridiculous to even consider letting the light-skinned person die. After all, dark-skinned people might have some rights, perhaps, but the suggestion that they might be as valuable as light-skinned people was utterly fantastical (note: I am being sarcastic here, of course; I don't actually agree with the above statement). Yet now, one hundred and fifty years later, most people (regardless of skin colour) take it without question that a person's skin colour has absolutely nothing to do with their moral value. I am not suggesting that the two arguments are at all identical, or that racism and speciesism are the same thing - they are not - but I do think that addressing even topics which at first seem to utterly contradict common sense, emotion, or social norms is both justifiable and necessary.
Sean brings up an interesting point in his post - the idea that sometimes, hypothetical situations in philosophical discussions become so absurd that they both cause debaters to lose touch with reality, and draw criticism to the entire discipline of philosophy. Such hypotheticals may attempt to chase pure logic so far that they toss aside instinct, emotion, and social norms quite heedlessly.
I think that Sean makes a good point, but I do not think we should cease investigating a subject when it begins to appear bizarre. Instead, perhaps more discretion is wise when discussing very controversial issues, at least until philosophers reach a firm conclusion. It is certainly true that, if many people heard many of the strange and fantastic debates that some philosophers engage in, their faith in philosophy (assuming they had any) would be shaken, and might disappear. However, while this might be cause for discretion, it is not at all cause for cessation of the debates! In fact, ceasing the debates would be at least as dangerous as indiscretion.
This is because, often, even strongly held social norms are wrong. Sean presents an example of a bizarre-sounding hypothetical discussion in his post: that of a case wherein one must either kill a wolf to save a child that the wolf is about to eat, or let the wolf devour the child. He states that any decent person would certainly take the first option, and that the second is repugnant regardless of what logic might say. While I will not disagree with this first statement (especially since I was not present for the aforementioned discussion, and so am not aware of its fine points), I vehemently reject the second. Logic is, I firmly believe, more relevant to moral discussion than social norms or emotion. What if this discussion had occurred one hundred and fifty years ago, and the question was whether it was right to kill a dark-skinned person to save a light-skinned one. Setting aside other factors, such as whether one of the people in question was attempting to harm the other, or whether they were of different ages or familial relation to the debater, I think that many (if not most) light-skinned people would have said it was ridiculous to even consider letting the light-skinned person die. After all, dark-skinned people might have some rights, perhaps, but the suggestion that they might be as valuable as light-skinned people was utterly fantastical (note: I am being sarcastic here, of course; I don't actually agree with the above statement). Yet now, one hundred and fifty years later, most people (regardless of skin colour) take it without question that a person's skin colour has absolutely nothing to do with their moral value. I am not suggesting that the two arguments are at all identical, or that racism and speciesism are the same thing - they are not - but I do think that addressing even topics which at first seem to utterly contradict common sense, emotion, or social norms is both justifiable and necessary.
Sunday, March 31, 2013
Labelling Products
In response to Andrew's question/answer post on 3/24/2013:
I agree that labelling animals used in scientific research does indeed affect people's perceptions of their moral statuses. The effect is akin to one of dehumanisation, although of course that term does not fit because the objects of it are not human. Deanimalisation? Regardless of linguistic minutiae, it helps people turn a blind eye to actions which they might otherwise find highly objectionable. While the scientific community provides one example of such a process, I think that the meat industry (once again!) takes the cake for most its most distasteful implementation.
The word 'pig,' according to both the Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries, primarily refers to a domesticated version of the animal known as a swine. The Oxford also says that 'pig' can refer to the meat of this animal. The word 'pork,' in contrast, refers only to the meat of a swine, specifically that meat when used as food. Neither the Oxford nor the Merriam-Webster says that 'pork' can correctly be used to refer to a living animal. And yet, the meat industry encourages us to do just this. Large pigs, such as those exhibited at fairs, are 'porkers.' Gazing out on field occupied by a group of pigs, a meat enthusiast might mention how fine that pork looks. Some advertisements refer to whole, living pigs as pork, before digitally separating the images into cuts of scrumptious meat with no gore or violence before viewers' eyes.
Pigs are not the sole victims of this odd terminological persecution. The words 'beef' and 'cattle' certainly existed as separate concepts long before the meat industry gained such a hold in American culture, but 'beef' referred to the corpses of cattle, not the living beasts. This blurring of lines between animal and product further contributes to the objectification of sentient non-humans raised for consumption.
I agree that labelling animals used in scientific research does indeed affect people's perceptions of their moral statuses. The effect is akin to one of dehumanisation, although of course that term does not fit because the objects of it are not human. Deanimalisation? Regardless of linguistic minutiae, it helps people turn a blind eye to actions which they might otherwise find highly objectionable. While the scientific community provides one example of such a process, I think that the meat industry (once again!) takes the cake for most its most distasteful implementation.
The word 'pig,' according to both the Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries, primarily refers to a domesticated version of the animal known as a swine. The Oxford also says that 'pig' can refer to the meat of this animal. The word 'pork,' in contrast, refers only to the meat of a swine, specifically that meat when used as food. Neither the Oxford nor the Merriam-Webster says that 'pork' can correctly be used to refer to a living animal. And yet, the meat industry encourages us to do just this. Large pigs, such as those exhibited at fairs, are 'porkers.' Gazing out on field occupied by a group of pigs, a meat enthusiast might mention how fine that pork looks. Some advertisements refer to whole, living pigs as pork, before digitally separating the images into cuts of scrumptious meat with no gore or violence before viewers' eyes.
Pigs are not the sole victims of this odd terminological persecution. The words 'beef' and 'cattle' certainly existed as separate concepts long before the meat industry gained such a hold in American culture, but 'beef' referred to the corpses of cattle, not the living beasts. This blurring of lines between animal and product further contributes to the objectification of sentient non-humans raised for consumption.
Q&A 6, Answer
My question is: Is killing an animal less immoral if one then
uses all parts of that animal, regardless of need?
Many people seem to subscribe to the belief that this is the case. I do not think that I agree. The usage of different parts of an animal after it is dead does no less harm to the animal; it is still dead. While using all of its corpse may seem 'respectful,' the dead animal does not care about respect. It does not care about anything, because it is dead.
Nor does the usage of the corpse justify killing the animal any more than it may already have been justified. In a situation in which one does not need to use any parts of an animal's corpse, then one should not kill the animal, since there is no need to do so. If one does so, and does not use any of the corpse, that is unethical. If one does so and then uses all of the corpse, it is still unethical, since none of those uses were necessary. Really, upon analysis, this notion seems almost ridiculous.
If one does need the corpse of an animal, to survive or for some other weighty reason which might justify discounting the life of the animal, then under no reasonable circumstances would one kill the animal and then fail to use its corpse! That would, indeed, be unethical, but more than that it would be nonsensical. If one kills the animal and then uses its corpse, killing the animal may have been morally justifiable, but not because of the use one made of its remains. Instead, the action was justifiable because of the circumstances surrounding it, which necessitated an otherwise immoral deed.
And therein, I think, lies the source of this common conception. Most of the time, people who use the entirety of animals' corpses do so because they need to, not because they want to. People in so-called third world countries who have few to no resources and have the means to hunt animals use all of those animals' corpses, because those are the only resources they have available for whatever purposes they need them for, at least without expending a great deal more time and effort to hunt more animals. Such people may be justified in hunting, and therefore their actions afterwards are inextricably linked to that justness, regardless of whether or not those actions are remotely morally relevant.
In short - no, killing an animal is no less immoral if one then uses all parts of that animal, but in the (relatively rare) circumstances in which one is justified in killing an animal, one is much more likely to utilise all or most parts of the corpse out of necessity.
Many people seem to subscribe to the belief that this is the case. I do not think that I agree. The usage of different parts of an animal after it is dead does no less harm to the animal; it is still dead. While using all of its corpse may seem 'respectful,' the dead animal does not care about respect. It does not care about anything, because it is dead.
Nor does the usage of the corpse justify killing the animal any more than it may already have been justified. In a situation in which one does not need to use any parts of an animal's corpse, then one should not kill the animal, since there is no need to do so. If one does so, and does not use any of the corpse, that is unethical. If one does so and then uses all of the corpse, it is still unethical, since none of those uses were necessary. Really, upon analysis, this notion seems almost ridiculous.
If one does need the corpse of an animal, to survive or for some other weighty reason which might justify discounting the life of the animal, then under no reasonable circumstances would one kill the animal and then fail to use its corpse! That would, indeed, be unethical, but more than that it would be nonsensical. If one kills the animal and then uses its corpse, killing the animal may have been morally justifiable, but not because of the use one made of its remains. Instead, the action was justifiable because of the circumstances surrounding it, which necessitated an otherwise immoral deed.
And therein, I think, lies the source of this common conception. Most of the time, people who use the entirety of animals' corpses do so because they need to, not because they want to. People in so-called third world countries who have few to no resources and have the means to hunt animals use all of those animals' corpses, because those are the only resources they have available for whatever purposes they need them for, at least without expending a great deal more time and effort to hunt more animals. Such people may be justified in hunting, and therefore their actions afterwards are inextricably linked to that justness, regardless of whether or not those actions are remotely morally relevant.
In short - no, killing an animal is no less immoral if one then uses all parts of that animal, but in the (relatively rare) circumstances in which one is justified in killing an animal, one is much more likely to utilise all or most parts of the corpse out of necessity.
Sunday, March 24, 2013
Other Avenues
In response to Quincy's post 'Where Do We Go From Here?' (3/20/2013):
Since many diseases and other problems which affect humanity today are not caused by bad nutrition, toxins, or unfortunate habits, but rather by variables outside human control (like naturally occurring bacteria and viruses), I do not think that we can avoid facing the issue of animal testing merely by improving our lifestyles. However, it is certainly true that the average lifestyle of a modern-day American, or (although often to a lesser extent) a modern-day resident of somewhere other than the United States is far from ideal in terms of health. That lifestyle has a heavy influence on susceptibility to disease and other problems is certain; statistics from many places around the world clearly illustrate the disadvantages of consuming toxins and lacking nutrition.
Thus, I think that a careful analysis of one's lifestyle can greatly improve one's chances of remaining relatively healthy. If everyone did this, it might limit the amount of animal testing 'necessary' (or perhaps not) to a very small minimum.
Since many diseases and other problems which affect humanity today are not caused by bad nutrition, toxins, or unfortunate habits, but rather by variables outside human control (like naturally occurring bacteria and viruses), I do not think that we can avoid facing the issue of animal testing merely by improving our lifestyles. However, it is certainly true that the average lifestyle of a modern-day American, or (although often to a lesser extent) a modern-day resident of somewhere other than the United States is far from ideal in terms of health. That lifestyle has a heavy influence on susceptibility to disease and other problems is certain; statistics from many places around the world clearly illustrate the disadvantages of consuming toxins and lacking nutrition.
Thus, I think that a careful analysis of one's lifestyle can greatly improve one's chances of remaining relatively healthy. If everyone did this, it might limit the amount of animal testing 'necessary' (or perhaps not) to a very small minimum.
Q&A 5, Answer
My question is: Are terminal diseases which affect only the very
old inconveniences (since the very old do not typically have long to live
regardless of disease) or ailments serious enough to justify testing?
I do not quite have an answer to this question, because I think that the terms in it cannot become adequately specific without diluting the meaning of the question. It is also problematic in other ways.
Few ailments afflict only the very old, although many affect this age group more than any other. Should the latter type of terminal disease fall into the same category as the former, or are the few younger individuals enough to boost it into the realm of serious issues rather than mere inconveniences?
If they are, that sounds troublingly like ageism. It is true that younger people typically have more years left to them than older people, but this is not always the case; besides, it is not simply length of life which determines the value a person gets out of remaining alive, but content of life. Making a distinction purely on the basis of age is discriminatory and unethical.
Furthermore, exactly how old does one have to be before becoming 'very old?' This question is important because it determines which illnesses might fall into the category under discussion. Perhaps one must be eighty years of age or more? But this worsens the problem of ageism. The relevance of age is based in the supposition that younger people have longer to life, but this may not be so! As an example, the average life expectancy in the United States today is seventy-eight point two years. If we round this up to eighty, then a person of forty has, on average, forty years left to live. A person of forty is definitely not 'very old.' What of the eighty-year-old? They have already passed the average life expectancy. Yet the oldest person recorded in the world died at the age of one hundred and twenty two, meaning that the eighty-year-old person has the potential, with precedent, to also live forty more years! The chances are far lower, but we cannot gauge that person's potential based on probability. There is also the distinct possibility that, given recent and probably future advances in medical technology, that person may live even longer than forty years. As such, I think that distinctions based on age are not justified, turning my original question back into the issue we have been addressing all week: Is animal testing justified for the benefit of humans (regardless of age)?
I do not quite have an answer to this question, because I think that the terms in it cannot become adequately specific without diluting the meaning of the question. It is also problematic in other ways.
Few ailments afflict only the very old, although many affect this age group more than any other. Should the latter type of terminal disease fall into the same category as the former, or are the few younger individuals enough to boost it into the realm of serious issues rather than mere inconveniences?
If they are, that sounds troublingly like ageism. It is true that younger people typically have more years left to them than older people, but this is not always the case; besides, it is not simply length of life which determines the value a person gets out of remaining alive, but content of life. Making a distinction purely on the basis of age is discriminatory and unethical.
Furthermore, exactly how old does one have to be before becoming 'very old?' This question is important because it determines which illnesses might fall into the category under discussion. Perhaps one must be eighty years of age or more? But this worsens the problem of ageism. The relevance of age is based in the supposition that younger people have longer to life, but this may not be so! As an example, the average life expectancy in the United States today is seventy-eight point two years. If we round this up to eighty, then a person of forty has, on average, forty years left to live. A person of forty is definitely not 'very old.' What of the eighty-year-old? They have already passed the average life expectancy. Yet the oldest person recorded in the world died at the age of one hundred and twenty two, meaning that the eighty-year-old person has the potential, with precedent, to also live forty more years! The chances are far lower, but we cannot gauge that person's potential based on probability. There is also the distinct possibility that, given recent and probably future advances in medical technology, that person may live even longer than forty years. As such, I think that distinctions based on age are not justified, turning my original question back into the issue we have been addressing all week: Is animal testing justified for the benefit of humans (regardless of age)?
Sunday, March 10, 2013
Moral Weight
In response to Kurt's post 'Vegetarianism and Culture' (3/10/2013):
I agree that it can sometimes be very difficult to adopt and maintain a vegetarian or vegan diet (or, in some cases, even a pescatarian diet) in modern America. Many non-meat-eating acquaintances of mine (not me personally, since I mostly live away from my family, and they are relatively supportive anyway) have dealt with this conflict by being vegetarian or vegan almost all the time, but making exceptions for Thanksgiving and other holidays.
While I see the benefit of this, and while it is easy enough to say that just one meal with meat won't make a difference, I think such a system has a definite downside in that it sends the wrong message. While it is true that the meat industry is so large that it produces surplus these days, and so eating part of a turkey once a year may not lead directly to the slaughter of another turkey, this would not be the case if, as we can hope, the meat industry mostly died off. Making a once-a-year exception then would have a much greater impact. I think it is important to communicate that eating meat is not okay (unless necessitated by health) even on holidays and other special occasions - although I also understand that many people may not choose to do this, and believe that it should be their own choice (at least until the meat industry dies, in which case it may become a matter of law or something like that).
I agree that it can sometimes be very difficult to adopt and maintain a vegetarian or vegan diet (or, in some cases, even a pescatarian diet) in modern America. Many non-meat-eating acquaintances of mine (not me personally, since I mostly live away from my family, and they are relatively supportive anyway) have dealt with this conflict by being vegetarian or vegan almost all the time, but making exceptions for Thanksgiving and other holidays.
While I see the benefit of this, and while it is easy enough to say that just one meal with meat won't make a difference, I think such a system has a definite downside in that it sends the wrong message. While it is true that the meat industry is so large that it produces surplus these days, and so eating part of a turkey once a year may not lead directly to the slaughter of another turkey, this would not be the case if, as we can hope, the meat industry mostly died off. Making a once-a-year exception then would have a much greater impact. I think it is important to communicate that eating meat is not okay (unless necessitated by health) even on holidays and other special occasions - although I also understand that many people may not choose to do this, and believe that it should be their own choice (at least until the meat industry dies, in which case it may become a matter of law or something like that).
Q&A 4, Answer 2
My question is: Is the use of animal products (such as leather) immoral if it does not require killing (or harming) animals?
As with my previous question, my initial thought is 'no.' Even upon reflection I still see nothing immoral in utilising animal products. However, for many people who are fully aware of the rights of animals, it might very well be distasteful.
I do not think it is immoral because if one does harm the animal in question in any way, its rights are not being violated. Similarly, it is not immoral to use human products as long as one harms no humans in doing so. For example, if a person decides to voluntarily provide their own milk, which their body generated, to you, so that one can make ice cream, no immorality is involved. I say 'voluntarily' because if one takes their milk against their will, then even if they are not physically harmed, one is psychologically harming them - and that would be immoral. Many people, though, would likely object to the idea of drinking human milk, and they might find it similarly disgusting to drink the milk of non-humans if they viewed animals accurately. Others would see nothing distasteful in either situation.
As with my previous question, my initial thought is 'no.' Even upon reflection I still see nothing immoral in utilising animal products. However, for many people who are fully aware of the rights of animals, it might very well be distasteful.
I do not think it is immoral because if one does harm the animal in question in any way, its rights are not being violated. Similarly, it is not immoral to use human products as long as one harms no humans in doing so. For example, if a person decides to voluntarily provide their own milk, which their body generated, to you, so that one can make ice cream, no immorality is involved. I say 'voluntarily' because if one takes their milk against their will, then even if they are not physically harmed, one is psychologically harming them - and that would be immoral. Many people, though, would likely object to the idea of drinking human milk, and they might find it similarly disgusting to drink the milk of non-humans if they viewed animals accurately. Others would see nothing distasteful in either situation.
Sunday, March 3, 2013
Overseas Obligation
In response to Brian's post 'Q&A Five Question One' (3/3/2013):
At the end of the post I'm responding to, Brian posed the question of whether there are any common situations in which a human's higher moral status actually requires a difference in treatment between the human and a non-human animal. While I agree that such situations are rare at, say, MCLA, in less developed or less wealthy areas of the world I think they can be quite common.
It is true that most humans can live quite well on a meat-free diet, but meat does provide some nutrients that are difficult to find elsewhere - for example, protein. For people like MCLA students, it is relatively easy to find other sources of protein, like beans, nuts, soy, and some grains. For people in many areas of the world, it is not nearly so simple.
In poor areas of America and other first-and-second-world countries, supermarkets are still readily available, and people might actually benefit economically from becoming vegetarians or vegans since rice and beans are far less expensive than meat. In third world countries where the climate does not permit beans to grow, or where most people are not able to obtain the supplies necessary to grow beans (like beans to start off a garden, adequate sun, adequate soil, or even water) or other non-animal protein sources, meat may be one of or even the only source of protein readily available to humans. In these cases, I think humans are morally justified in consuming meat and other animal products to sustain their own existences.
At the end of the post I'm responding to, Brian posed the question of whether there are any common situations in which a human's higher moral status actually requires a difference in treatment between the human and a non-human animal. While I agree that such situations are rare at, say, MCLA, in less developed or less wealthy areas of the world I think they can be quite common.
It is true that most humans can live quite well on a meat-free diet, but meat does provide some nutrients that are difficult to find elsewhere - for example, protein. For people like MCLA students, it is relatively easy to find other sources of protein, like beans, nuts, soy, and some grains. For people in many areas of the world, it is not nearly so simple.
In poor areas of America and other first-and-second-world countries, supermarkets are still readily available, and people might actually benefit economically from becoming vegetarians or vegans since rice and beans are far less expensive than meat. In third world countries where the climate does not permit beans to grow, or where most people are not able to obtain the supplies necessary to grow beans (like beans to start off a garden, adequate sun, adequate soil, or even water) or other non-animal protein sources, meat may be one of or even the only source of protein readily available to humans. In these cases, I think humans are morally justified in consuming meat and other animal products to sustain their own existences.
Q&A 4, Answer
My question is: Is eating meat in and of itself problematic? If people developed a way to produce meat artificially, without killing animals, could they morally consume it?
My first impulse in regards to this question is to say 'no.' Laboratory-grown meat, such as scientists have just begun to produce, is no more sentient than plants or fungi, and as such eating it is not ethically problematic. However, I wonder about the residual association of meat with violence; since most humans have grown up eating meat gathered from the corpses of slaughtered animals, they might continue to connect the substance to the original source, thus leading to the generalised violence of nature which some philosophers have argued is the greatest argument against harming animals.
That said, even if meat does continue to link up with violence in people's minds, laboratory-grown meat may be the best choice out of grim options. It is highly unlikely, I believe, that all of humanity will adopt vegetarianism (combined with ethical treatment of cows, chickens, and other produce-creating animals) or veganism (in the absence of the above). Humans tend to dislike having to give up something they enjoy, even for a good cause; it is one reason why forward-thinking environmentalist movements usually focus on renewable energy, rather than the cessation of technology use. Even the most grill-obsessed omnivore might adopt an ethical diet if said diet contained all the meaty delights they knew and loved. Hopefully, with time, the negative associations of meat-eating would disappear.
My first impulse in regards to this question is to say 'no.' Laboratory-grown meat, such as scientists have just begun to produce, is no more sentient than plants or fungi, and as such eating it is not ethically problematic. However, I wonder about the residual association of meat with violence; since most humans have grown up eating meat gathered from the corpses of slaughtered animals, they might continue to connect the substance to the original source, thus leading to the generalised violence of nature which some philosophers have argued is the greatest argument against harming animals.
That said, even if meat does continue to link up with violence in people's minds, laboratory-grown meat may be the best choice out of grim options. It is highly unlikely, I believe, that all of humanity will adopt vegetarianism (combined with ethical treatment of cows, chickens, and other produce-creating animals) or veganism (in the absence of the above). Humans tend to dislike having to give up something they enjoy, even for a good cause; it is one reason why forward-thinking environmentalist movements usually focus on renewable energy, rather than the cessation of technology use. Even the most grill-obsessed omnivore might adopt an ethical diet if said diet contained all the meaty delights they knew and loved. Hopefully, with time, the negative associations of meat-eating would disappear.
Sunday, February 24, 2013
Classism (punnery)
In response to Brandon's post "Dolphins, Apes, Pigs, Whales, and... Parrots!" (2/24/2013):
I would guess that many people usually exclude parrots from the list of highly intelligent creatures because they differ more greatly from humans than do any of the other animals you listed above. Dolphins, apes, pigs, and whales all belong to the class 'mammalia.' Parrots, on the other hand, belong to the class 'aves,' or birds. As such, many people do not consider them when thinking of intelligent creatures, since they are not at all close to a link in the chain of sentient mammals at the top of which are humans. Indeed, due to their differences from mammals and the common misconception that all birds are unintelligent, many people treat them as though they were fish - decorative pets with no emotional needs and few practical ones. This could not, of course, be further from the truth; most parrots are highly intelligent and social animals, and depriving them of attention, affection, space, or anything relating to their physical well-being is extremely detrimental to their psychology, and is an unethical practice perhaps comparable to depriving a small child of those same things.
By restricting philosophical discussions of morality to our own class, people may have more success convincing sceptics of the validity of animal consciousness. Due to the incorrect beliefs many people have about birds, attempting to include parrots in essays on or discussions of animal intelligence might tempt readers/discussers to dismiss an entire argument as obviously batty. An argument focussed instead on those animals most people agree are intelligent may have much greater impact. On the other hand, by ignoring parrots, people contribute to the continued ignorance of these birds' intellectual and emotional needs, and may lose out on a valuable source of information, since in many ways (for example, the way in which they use language, specifically names) parrots are more similar to humans than any other intelligent animals.
I would guess that many people usually exclude parrots from the list of highly intelligent creatures because they differ more greatly from humans than do any of the other animals you listed above. Dolphins, apes, pigs, and whales all belong to the class 'mammalia.' Parrots, on the other hand, belong to the class 'aves,' or birds. As such, many people do not consider them when thinking of intelligent creatures, since they are not at all close to a link in the chain of sentient mammals at the top of which are humans. Indeed, due to their differences from mammals and the common misconception that all birds are unintelligent, many people treat them as though they were fish - decorative pets with no emotional needs and few practical ones. This could not, of course, be further from the truth; most parrots are highly intelligent and social animals, and depriving them of attention, affection, space, or anything relating to their physical well-being is extremely detrimental to their psychology, and is an unethical practice perhaps comparable to depriving a small child of those same things.
By restricting philosophical discussions of morality to our own class, people may have more success convincing sceptics of the validity of animal consciousness. Due to the incorrect beliefs many people have about birds, attempting to include parrots in essays on or discussions of animal intelligence might tempt readers/discussers to dismiss an entire argument as obviously batty. An argument focussed instead on those animals most people agree are intelligent may have much greater impact. On the other hand, by ignoring parrots, people contribute to the continued ignorance of these birds' intellectual and emotional needs, and may lose out on a valuable source of information, since in many ways (for example, the way in which they use language, specifically names) parrots are more similar to humans than any other intelligent animals.
Facts and Fictions
In response to Brandon Gaudet's post "A Tailored Mandate" (2/24/2013) (which is itself a response to Sean Edwards's post "To Veg, or Not to Veg" (2/24/2013)):
While it is true that some people cannot sustain the necessary nutrition for good health from a diet entirely free of meat or of animal products, the idea that this is a common state is false. Some vegetarians and vegans are nutrient-deficient, and some sustain negative effects from certain elements of the food they eat to make up for a lack of meat and/or other animal products (for example, soy contains high levels of estrogen, a hormone which can cause emotional and physical problems when in concentration), but this is mostly due to insufficient research and resultant poor dietary choices. A select few have special conditions (some extreme forms of anemia, for example, or an inability to absorb certain nutrients from sources other than meat) which render them unable to adopt a vegan or vegetarian diet, but as stated above, such ailments are not common. Even those who do suffer from some digestive disability or other physical obstacle can often limit their meat consumption to fish, or cease eating dairy while continuing to consume eggs. Such issues aside, many people (including men, women, the elderly, and the very young) thrive on vegan or vegetarian diets; in fact, as long as the dieters keeps track of which nutrients they are consuming, they are typically healthier than people who embrace omnivorous diets.
One related idea, which I find more morally intriguing, is the concept of feeding pets or other animals in one's care with only vegan or vegetarian products. While many animals are naturally herbivorous, or are omnivorous but can easily adjust to a herbivorous diet, many others are carnivores or are omnivores for whom meat is an important part of nutrition. While such animals may be able to survive on herbivorous diets, their health may be negatively affected. Is it ethical to deprive them of some quality of life in order to support the continued existence of other animals?
While it is true that some people cannot sustain the necessary nutrition for good health from a diet entirely free of meat or of animal products, the idea that this is a common state is false. Some vegetarians and vegans are nutrient-deficient, and some sustain negative effects from certain elements of the food they eat to make up for a lack of meat and/or other animal products (for example, soy contains high levels of estrogen, a hormone which can cause emotional and physical problems when in concentration), but this is mostly due to insufficient research and resultant poor dietary choices. A select few have special conditions (some extreme forms of anemia, for example, or an inability to absorb certain nutrients from sources other than meat) which render them unable to adopt a vegan or vegetarian diet, but as stated above, such ailments are not common. Even those who do suffer from some digestive disability or other physical obstacle can often limit their meat consumption to fish, or cease eating dairy while continuing to consume eggs. Such issues aside, many people (including men, women, the elderly, and the very young) thrive on vegan or vegetarian diets; in fact, as long as the dieters keeps track of which nutrients they are consuming, they are typically healthier than people who embrace omnivorous diets.
One related idea, which I find more morally intriguing, is the concept of feeding pets or other animals in one's care with only vegan or vegetarian products. While many animals are naturally herbivorous, or are omnivorous but can easily adjust to a herbivorous diet, many others are carnivores or are omnivores for whom meat is an important part of nutrition. While such animals may be able to survive on herbivorous diets, their health may be negatively affected. Is it ethical to deprive them of some quality of life in order to support the continued existence of other animals?
Sunday, February 17, 2013
What is Harm?
In response to Tyler's post "Love, love, love" (2/11/2013):
While I think that the idea of learning to love oneself and other moral beings through practicing non-violence towards even nonmoral beings has merit, and is certainly interesting, it also brings up a question - what, exactly, is harm? Obviously in the case of a sentient creature, like a dog, harm is something which causes pain or suffering, but what about in the case of, as Tyler mentions, a robot? The robot cannot experience pain and cannot suffer. It can 'malfunction,' but all that means is it can fail to act as it is supposed to, and who is doing that supposing but humans? If a human decides the function of the robot in the first place, presumably they can later on change that function. This could occur in a mild form (i.e. the original function is to type on a keyboard, and the later function is to play a piano) or an extreme form (i.e. the original function is to type, but the later one is to make a decorative centerpiece for someone's table after being melted down and smashed up into an interesting shape). Can anyone decisively say if any of these changes in function are harming the robot? It cannot itself communicate or experience distress, and it cannot value itself. All its value stems from outside. As such, it cannot truly be harmed.
While I think that the idea of learning to love oneself and other moral beings through practicing non-violence towards even nonmoral beings has merit, and is certainly interesting, it also brings up a question - what, exactly, is harm? Obviously in the case of a sentient creature, like a dog, harm is something which causes pain or suffering, but what about in the case of, as Tyler mentions, a robot? The robot cannot experience pain and cannot suffer. It can 'malfunction,' but all that means is it can fail to act as it is supposed to, and who is doing that supposing but humans? If a human decides the function of the robot in the first place, presumably they can later on change that function. This could occur in a mild form (i.e. the original function is to type on a keyboard, and the later function is to play a piano) or an extreme form (i.e. the original function is to type, but the later one is to make a decorative centerpiece for someone's table after being melted down and smashed up into an interesting shape). Can anyone decisively say if any of these changes in function are harming the robot? It cannot itself communicate or experience distress, and it cannot value itself. All its value stems from outside. As such, it cannot truly be harmed.
Q&A 3, Answer
My question is: If a person provides conflicting behavioural and
linguistic evidence, as in Lynch’s ‘Mary’ example, which evidence is more compelling?
'Actions speak louder than words.' A lot of people use this saying, but I wonder how many mean it. It is certainly true some of the time; for example, most people agree that in most if, for example, a child claims not to have eaten a cookie but is covered in crumbs, they are probably lying. Similarly, although more seriously, if a person is in a relationship with a partner who regularly abuses them and then apologises afterwards but makes no effort to change, they should pay attention to their partner's actions more than their words and leave or get help.
Are there not other situations, though, when people give more weight to words than to actions? I think so. If a person is experiencing muscle spasms and breaks a vase, then says that they didn't and don't intend to break anything even as they smash another piece of pottery, one can probably trust their words - especially if one knew previously about their condition, or if they explain during the episode. In fact, if a person can give a good reason for acting a certain way, I think many people will heed the explanation more than the action. Some actions are seemingly meaningless without explanations.
As such, I think that neither Lynch nor Carruthers makes a convincing general case with the 'Mary' example. In order to determine whether one should believe Mary's actions or her words, one would have to know more background information; therefore, that particular example does not serve well to prove a point in either philosopher's favour.
'Actions speak louder than words.' A lot of people use this saying, but I wonder how many mean it. It is certainly true some of the time; for example, most people agree that in most if, for example, a child claims not to have eaten a cookie but is covered in crumbs, they are probably lying. Similarly, although more seriously, if a person is in a relationship with a partner who regularly abuses them and then apologises afterwards but makes no effort to change, they should pay attention to their partner's actions more than their words and leave or get help.
Are there not other situations, though, when people give more weight to words than to actions? I think so. If a person is experiencing muscle spasms and breaks a vase, then says that they didn't and don't intend to break anything even as they smash another piece of pottery, one can probably trust their words - especially if one knew previously about their condition, or if they explain during the episode. In fact, if a person can give a good reason for acting a certain way, I think many people will heed the explanation more than the action. Some actions are seemingly meaningless without explanations.
As such, I think that neither Lynch nor Carruthers makes a convincing general case with the 'Mary' example. In order to determine whether one should believe Mary's actions or her words, one would have to know more background information; therefore, that particular example does not serve well to prove a point in either philosopher's favour.
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