Q&A 2, Answer

My question is: If one’s level of sentience determines where one falls on the sliding scale of moral value, how morally valuable are children?

I am honestly not certain as of yet.  Initially, I agreed with Brian that the high level of moral value we place on children is a reflection of sentiment rather than any inherent value held by the children themselves.  However, upon reflection, I realised that since moral value is not solely dependent upon rational capability on top of a baseline of sentience, this may not be true.  Children, on average, cannot reason as effectively as most adults, but they often possess greater creative capabilities, and are able to learn many things at a much faster rate.  This makes determining their place on the sliding scale much more difficult, at the least.

Furthermore, children possess other kinds of value which may increase their moral value.  They are often more indirectly valuable, since the sentiment adult humans attach to children is frequently greater than that which they attach to other adults.  They are also evolutionarily valuable, and while evolutionary value does not translate directly into ethics, the two often end up intermingled.

As such, I am still unsure where children fall on the sliding scale.  I would greatly appreciate any thoughts on the matter!

Shifting Slightly

In response to Brian Fitzpatrick's post 'The Moral Efficacy of Lies' (2/9/2013):

I think that lying to promote the cause of animal rights, regardless of whether it is moral, is ineffective.  It is true that utilising sentiment rather than reason can have a great effect, especially on large numbers of people who are not, in their everyday lives, critical thinkers.  However, there is a good chance that a while after hearing an emotional speech, people will start to reconsider whatever new resolutions they made upon hearing that speech, and are likely to research some of the facts cited.  If they find that some of those facts are not true, they may drop the whole idea in disgust, assuming that the only reason a speaker would lie is because they could not accomplish their objective without doing so.

Advocates of animal rights do not need to lie to achieve an emotional effect.  Simply showing some of the widely-available videos of the inner workings of the meat industry can be perfectly effective.  Speaking sincerely about some of the extremely bad treatment of animals that goes on in America and many other places can have a very serious emotional effect.

I am not, myself, a fan of sentiment-based arguments - I prefer to ground my arguments in reason, since sentiment is not universally shared (and, indeed, if I based my behaviour towards animals on sentiment I would be eating hamburg with every meal since I personally despise cows).  However, sentiment may be widely shared, so I do not object to the use of care ethics or other sentiment-based arguments to reach large numbers of people, provided that the arguers also have reason to back their arguments up.