In response to Andrew's post 'Humanely Killing?' (5/5/2013):
In his post, Andrew mentions that one of the few cases in which killing an animal might be justified is if that animal is in chronic pain. This does not seem unreasonable; after all, many countries are now considering the morality of allowing voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide for humans in similar situations. Since animals cannot give their consent to euthanasia, in some cases it might be best to have their human guardians consent on their behalf. Currently, vet's offices euthanise many sick animals every year, ending their suffering in a painless manner akin to falling asleep.
Yet there is a problem with this system as it is currently implemented. There are few to no regulations on 'pet' euthanasia. True, many guardians only bring in their companion animals for this purpose when the animals are clearly in severe pain, and their suffering is not due to a temporary condition, but others may ask for their companion animal to be euthanised for petty or otherwise immoral reasons. Some of the most common are: the guardian is moving to an apartment which will not allow companion animals, the companion animal turned out to be more difficult to care for than the guardian supposed, or someone in the guardian's family (perhaps a new spouse) dislikes or is allergic to the companion animal. These are clearly not good reasons to end the life of a healthy animal! And yet, the decision to euthanise is still left up to subjective human judgement. Veterinarians do have the power to refuse to euthanise an animal, but some veterinarians do not care what they do as long as they are paid for it, and others find themselves in situations where they risk losing their jobs if they refuse to euthanise.
I think that there should be extremely strict laws on companion animal euthanasia - if anything, I think that these laws should be stricter than on voluntary human euthanasia or assisted suicide, since the companion animals themselves cannot consent. I think that these laws should prevent veterinarians from euthanising healthy animals, protect those who refuse to euthanise, and probably also provide measures to remove companion animals from guardians who clearly have little or no concern for their welfare and place them in homes with new, caring guardians.
Wednesday, May 8, 2013
Enforced Morality vs. Natural Morality
In response to Brian's post 'Metaethical Concerns' (5/7/2013):
In his post, Brian mentions the fairly common belief that one must be religious in order to be moral. While he does not agree with this view, he states that it may have a grain of truth, since without an all-powerful authority figure imposing rewards and punishments for good and bad behaviour, why should humans be moral?
To some extent, I can certainly see the point of this argument. The basis of morality may indeed be constructed. Yet statistically speaking, irreligious people are no more likely on an individual basis to commit crimes or act negatively than religious people. On a group or national basis, they are considerably less likely. If religion helps justify morality, why is this so?
I think that there are several reasons. To begin with, not every irreligious person is a critical thinker, and so may not even consider why or why not they should act morally - and since moral behaviour is conducive to the well-being of society as a whole, the 'default' stance is to act morally. Many irreligious people have other systems of ideology, whether political, 'spiritual,' or social, which impose moral systems in a similar manner to religion. I think that only a small percentage of irreligious people look towards philosophy for moral guidance, and of those who do, a number of them probably never investigate metaethics in particular, which is where this problem of basis for morality lies.
The small number who do investigate metaethics, and the smaller number who come to the conclusion that morality rests on a construct, are still more likely to act morally than not. Since humans are social animals, it is programmed into most of us, I think, to act in a way which will contribute to a smoothly functioning society. Therefore, even those people who conclude that they have no objective or exterior reason to act morally will probably act morally anyway. The percentage who do not is so tiny as to not register in large-group statistics.
In his post, Brian mentions the fairly common belief that one must be religious in order to be moral. While he does not agree with this view, he states that it may have a grain of truth, since without an all-powerful authority figure imposing rewards and punishments for good and bad behaviour, why should humans be moral?
To some extent, I can certainly see the point of this argument. The basis of morality may indeed be constructed. Yet statistically speaking, irreligious people are no more likely on an individual basis to commit crimes or act negatively than religious people. On a group or national basis, they are considerably less likely. If religion helps justify morality, why is this so?
I think that there are several reasons. To begin with, not every irreligious person is a critical thinker, and so may not even consider why or why not they should act morally - and since moral behaviour is conducive to the well-being of society as a whole, the 'default' stance is to act morally. Many irreligious people have other systems of ideology, whether political, 'spiritual,' or social, which impose moral systems in a similar manner to religion. I think that only a small percentage of irreligious people look towards philosophy for moral guidance, and of those who do, a number of them probably never investigate metaethics in particular, which is where this problem of basis for morality lies.
The small number who do investigate metaethics, and the smaller number who come to the conclusion that morality rests on a construct, are still more likely to act morally than not. Since humans are social animals, it is programmed into most of us, I think, to act in a way which will contribute to a smoothly functioning society. Therefore, even those people who conclude that they have no objective or exterior reason to act morally will probably act morally anyway. The percentage who do not is so tiny as to not register in large-group statistics.
Final Essay!
Well, here is the final draft of my essay. Any comments would be most welcome!
Vegetarianism
is morally obligatory for most humans because all sentient entities have at
least two basic rights: the right to life and the right to freedom from harm. These rights stem from sentient beings’
abilities to consciously value themselves and to suffer.
The
capacity to consciously value oneself, and one’s continued existence, is the
most basic and reliable source of value because it relies only on internal
factors. Externally generated valuing
also contributes to the moral relevance of a being (for example, while one can
normally kill a human or a dog who, due to some injury or disease, exists in a
permanently vegetative state without violating moral principles, one cannot
morally kill that individual if others place value on their life), but even in
its absence, internally generated value usually remains.
No valid reason to seriously doubt that many
non-human animals are conscious exists. Like
humans, non-humans animals adapt to different situations, develop and achieve
apparent goals, and visibly react to pain.
Humans possess no brain structures specific to their species which could
feasibly grant them, uniquely, consciousness.
Frey’s argument from language does not prohibit the possibility of
non-humans having beliefs, desires, and interests; possessing those things
makes language acquisition possible, not the other way around. Otherwise, human infants could never learn
language.
Since they have
consciousness, animals can value themselves and their own well-being, and they
seem to do so. They make efforts to
avoid pain and death while pursuing pleasure and health. As with consciousness, assuming that animals
act in these ways for a different set of reasons than humans defies common
sense. If animals do value themselves,
they have the rights to life and freedom from suffering.
Some advocates against
vegetarianism state that since humans have a right to pursue happiness, and eating
meat makes many humans happy, vegetarianism cannot be morally obligatory;
however, ‘meat’ animals’ right to life usually supersedes humans’ right to
pursue happiness in that particular way.
One can no more ethically derive enjoyment from a non-human animal’s
death than from murdering an innocent human.
Similarly, the right to freedom of choice and the right to continue
cultural traditions (which often include meat-eating) fail to override more
important rights. Most rights rely on
the prior existence of the right to life, and the right to life takes
precedence over them.
Depending on its manner of
implementation, a mass transition to vegetarianism could cause or contribute to
economic disaster for many countries. However, if a populace transitions gradually, it
does not have to do so. Even if it did, countries
would still be able to feed their citizens because plants are a much more
efficient source of food than animals.
The economic disaster would cause inconvenience but not mass death, and avoiding
inconvenience cannot justify eating animals.
Some people reject vegetarianism because
they believe plants and animals have the same rights. This view usually rests on one of two flawed
assumptions, however. The first states
that rights stem from the possession of life.
As I state in the above paragraphs, rights stem from the capacity to
value oneself. The second states that
plants are sentient. While plants, in
spite of the current total lack of evidence, might potentially possess
consciousness to some degree, animals almost certainly do; and since humans
must eat to survive, they should choose the lesser of two evils (or an evil and
a morally neutral action) and consume plants.
In the first paragraph of this
essay, I stated that most, not all, humans should adopt vegetarianism. If a human can only obtain certain nutrients
from meat due to some medical condition preventing absorption from other
sources, the right to self-defense allows them to consume meat. They may also maintain an omnivorous
lifestyle if they live in a location or situation where they can obtain no
other sources of necessary nutrition (as in many so-called ‘third world’
countries) or if they have allergies and intolerances – serious ones, not simply
inconveniences – which prohibit them from consuming other sources of nutrition.
I think that the arguments I
present above lead to the conclusion that vegetarianism is morally
obligatory. Furthermore, I think that
they extend, with only slight modification, to the conclusion that veganism is
morally obligatory. Only the right to
self-defense can mitigate these obligations, and that right applies in very few
cases.
Sunday, May 5, 2013
Leading by Example
In response to Andy's post 'The Final Count Down' (4/29/2013):
One point which Andy's post brings up is that some people are not terribly well-suited to be activists, simply due to personality.
I think this is true, but I do not think that this means such people are unimportant in the field of activism, even if they are not activists themselves. Leading by example can do just as much as, if not more than, vocally advocating for a cause. Clearly, doing both is ideal, but if a person can do just one, I am at least slightly inclined to say that they should lead by example.
If a meat-eater who has no medical or otherwise valid moral reason not to become vegetarian or vegan advocates for vegetarianism or veganism, they will likely have great difficulty convincing people to listen to them. Hypocrisy, while not actually relevant to an argument from logic, nevertheless has a large emotional impact on many people. For example, Peter Singer's argument that everyone should donate as large a portion of their income as possible to poverty relief would probably have a larger following if he donated such a percentage himself. Philosophers, logicians, and some others may consistently differentiate between the argument and the individual making it, but the populace as a whole does not, so a hypocritical advocate for animal rights is unlikely to make much of an impact.
In contrast, a non-activist vegetarian or vegan may end up inadvertently convincing others to adopt their viewpoint. Since they are not adopting a directly aggressive stance, as many activists do, people will feel less inclined to defend themselves mindlessly, and may actually think about the non-activist's points. They may also feel less intimidated, and be therefore more likely to ask questions. If a vegetarian or vegan explains, upon request, their reasoning for adopting their diet, meat-eaters may consider their arguments later on, and perhaps be persuaded.
I do still think that the ideal position for a supporter of animal rights to take is one of both activism and personal action. I am opposed to the idea of violent, or even especially aggressive, activism, because the first misses the entire point and I don't think that the second is effective. Instead, I support rational, civil activism, wherein one uses reasoned and polite arguments to attempt to sway others to one's cause. One does not insult them or lean overly much on emotionally charged arguments, although some use of emotions or even care ethics may be justified.
One point which Andy's post brings up is that some people are not terribly well-suited to be activists, simply due to personality.
I think this is true, but I do not think that this means such people are unimportant in the field of activism, even if they are not activists themselves. Leading by example can do just as much as, if not more than, vocally advocating for a cause. Clearly, doing both is ideal, but if a person can do just one, I am at least slightly inclined to say that they should lead by example.
If a meat-eater who has no medical or otherwise valid moral reason not to become vegetarian or vegan advocates for vegetarianism or veganism, they will likely have great difficulty convincing people to listen to them. Hypocrisy, while not actually relevant to an argument from logic, nevertheless has a large emotional impact on many people. For example, Peter Singer's argument that everyone should donate as large a portion of their income as possible to poverty relief would probably have a larger following if he donated such a percentage himself. Philosophers, logicians, and some others may consistently differentiate between the argument and the individual making it, but the populace as a whole does not, so a hypocritical advocate for animal rights is unlikely to make much of an impact.
In contrast, a non-activist vegetarian or vegan may end up inadvertently convincing others to adopt their viewpoint. Since they are not adopting a directly aggressive stance, as many activists do, people will feel less inclined to defend themselves mindlessly, and may actually think about the non-activist's points. They may also feel less intimidated, and be therefore more likely to ask questions. If a vegetarian or vegan explains, upon request, their reasoning for adopting their diet, meat-eaters may consider their arguments later on, and perhaps be persuaded.
I do still think that the ideal position for a supporter of animal rights to take is one of both activism and personal action. I am opposed to the idea of violent, or even especially aggressive, activism, because the first misses the entire point and I don't think that the second is effective. Instead, I support rational, civil activism, wherein one uses reasoned and polite arguments to attempt to sway others to one's cause. One does not insult them or lean overly much on emotionally charged arguments, although some use of emotions or even care ethics may be justified.
Hindsight is Sometimes Unpleasant
In response to Sebastian's post 'Animals in the Future' (5/28/2013):
In his post, Sebastian wonders whether humanity, in the future, will ever look back at the current treatment of animals with the same attitude that humanity today looks back at sexism or slavery.
I think it is certainly possible! However, I think that it will take longer than the movements against sexism and slavery took to (mostly) disappear. This is because it is more widespread, older, and based on larger differences than either of those movements.
Sexism has been around for a while, certainly, but probably not since before civilisation began. It is based on (sometimes) visible differences in sex and on differences in gender, but that is it. Everyone involved in sexism, whether those benefiting from, those perpetuating, or those suffering from it, is human. Furthermore, not all nations on earth are or have been sexist.
Slavery has also been around for a while, but certainly not since before civilisation began. Not all nations on earth have endorsed it at any point. It is usually based either on birth, which is entirely arbitrary and impossible to detect in and of itself, on victory or defeat in war, which is entirely changeable and relates to what has happened to a person, not who they are, or on skin colour, which is a purely phenotypical difference even less important than gender. Again, everyone involved in it in any capacity is human
Bad treatment of animals is almost worldwide in range (even primarily vegetarian/vegan countries, like India, still endorse other types of mistreatment), has been around since before the rise of civilisation (humanity evolved as an omnivorous species), and is based on fairly significant differences in appearance and capacity. The latter is not true in the cases of sexism and slavery. As such, while I am optimistic about the potential for human society to eventually move past its horrific maltreatment of animals, I am not under any illusions that we will look back on current practices with disgust any time soon.
In his post, Sebastian wonders whether humanity, in the future, will ever look back at the current treatment of animals with the same attitude that humanity today looks back at sexism or slavery.
I think it is certainly possible! However, I think that it will take longer than the movements against sexism and slavery took to (mostly) disappear. This is because it is more widespread, older, and based on larger differences than either of those movements.
Sexism has been around for a while, certainly, but probably not since before civilisation began. It is based on (sometimes) visible differences in sex and on differences in gender, but that is it. Everyone involved in sexism, whether those benefiting from, those perpetuating, or those suffering from it, is human. Furthermore, not all nations on earth are or have been sexist.
Slavery has also been around for a while, but certainly not since before civilisation began. Not all nations on earth have endorsed it at any point. It is usually based either on birth, which is entirely arbitrary and impossible to detect in and of itself, on victory or defeat in war, which is entirely changeable and relates to what has happened to a person, not who they are, or on skin colour, which is a purely phenotypical difference even less important than gender. Again, everyone involved in it in any capacity is human
Bad treatment of animals is almost worldwide in range (even primarily vegetarian/vegan countries, like India, still endorse other types of mistreatment), has been around since before the rise of civilisation (humanity evolved as an omnivorous species), and is based on fairly significant differences in appearance and capacity. The latter is not true in the cases of sexism and slavery. As such, while I am optimistic about the potential for human society to eventually move past its horrific maltreatment of animals, I am not under any illusions that we will look back on current practices with disgust any time soon.
New Perspective On History
I was recently thinking about the fact that society does not just make it more difficult for people to be vegetarian or vegan, it sometimes makes it impossible.
For example, MCLA's mandatory meal plan makes it impossible for a person to be vegan without eating nuts or soy (nut allergies are common, as is soy intolerance), without paying for food in addition to the meal plan (which is insanely expensive) and while still getting adequate nutrition until senior year, at which point the meal plan is no longer mandatory. At first I just viewed this as a simple societal prejudice, regrettable but not terrible, but upon thinking further, I realised that it is much more than that. By not providing vegan options, and then demanding that all MCLA students who are not seniors pay ridiculous amounts to eat only Aramark food, MCLA is effectively forcing students to engage in immoral behaviour. The only way to avoid this is to get a doctor's note (which many doctors will not provide) or drop out of school. The latter option, while more moral in the short run, may end up causing more harm in the long run, since it is far more possible to influence society, and other people, from a position of societal significance such as that a college education can help afford.
Now, perhaps the students are not being immoral as such, since ought implies can, and they cannot safely consume a vegan diet while in their first three years at MCLA. But certainly there is some sort of immorality going on, whether on the part of Aramark inc. or MCLA, or both. This kind of situation is not unique to MCLA, either; many other colleges have the same problem, as do numerous other kinds of institution. I must imagine that it is difficult to be vegan, or perhaps even vegetarian, in prison. It is certainly difficult, often impossible, to do so when homeless or otherwise reliant on soup kitchens/free church food/similar things - often, these organisations only offer one or two food options, and most of the time they contain meat (or, at the very least, eggs and dairy). Thus, society immorally forces a meat-eating diet on a substantial number of people. This is immoral for two reasons: one, it deprives people of their right to choose their diet, and may cause many psychological harm by their knowledge that they are eating dead animals, which they would not otherwise choose to eat, and two, it causes the death and suffering of innumerable non-human animals.
This made me wonder about the past, and the various institutional evils present at different periods therein. Often, when we look back at the past, we blame people for not taking a stand against immoral practices, like sexism or slavery. We seem to assume that they are choosing to be lazy, that they could act morally if they simply chose to do so and would put in a bit of effort. Even if we acknowledge that it would be difficult, we certainly don't deny that it is possible. Yet is this always the case? In past America, if one was a slave owner, would freeing all of one's slaves actually have caused any good? Or would the formally enslaved people simply be re-captured and forced back into slavery, perhaps under worse conditions than before? I don't know the answers to those sorts of questions. Yet, being in a position of forced immorality myself, I must look back on people of the past with a more analytical eye, rather than immediately dismissing their actions as the results of lazy conformity.
For example, MCLA's mandatory meal plan makes it impossible for a person to be vegan without eating nuts or soy (nut allergies are common, as is soy intolerance), without paying for food in addition to the meal plan (which is insanely expensive) and while still getting adequate nutrition until senior year, at which point the meal plan is no longer mandatory. At first I just viewed this as a simple societal prejudice, regrettable but not terrible, but upon thinking further, I realised that it is much more than that. By not providing vegan options, and then demanding that all MCLA students who are not seniors pay ridiculous amounts to eat only Aramark food, MCLA is effectively forcing students to engage in immoral behaviour. The only way to avoid this is to get a doctor's note (which many doctors will not provide) or drop out of school. The latter option, while more moral in the short run, may end up causing more harm in the long run, since it is far more possible to influence society, and other people, from a position of societal significance such as that a college education can help afford.
Now, perhaps the students are not being immoral as such, since ought implies can, and they cannot safely consume a vegan diet while in their first three years at MCLA. But certainly there is some sort of immorality going on, whether on the part of Aramark inc. or MCLA, or both. This kind of situation is not unique to MCLA, either; many other colleges have the same problem, as do numerous other kinds of institution. I must imagine that it is difficult to be vegan, or perhaps even vegetarian, in prison. It is certainly difficult, often impossible, to do so when homeless or otherwise reliant on soup kitchens/free church food/similar things - often, these organisations only offer one or two food options, and most of the time they contain meat (or, at the very least, eggs and dairy). Thus, society immorally forces a meat-eating diet on a substantial number of people. This is immoral for two reasons: one, it deprives people of their right to choose their diet, and may cause many psychological harm by their knowledge that they are eating dead animals, which they would not otherwise choose to eat, and two, it causes the death and suffering of innumerable non-human animals.
This made me wonder about the past, and the various institutional evils present at different periods therein. Often, when we look back at the past, we blame people for not taking a stand against immoral practices, like sexism or slavery. We seem to assume that they are choosing to be lazy, that they could act morally if they simply chose to do so and would put in a bit of effort. Even if we acknowledge that it would be difficult, we certainly don't deny that it is possible. Yet is this always the case? In past America, if one was a slave owner, would freeing all of one's slaves actually have caused any good? Or would the formally enslaved people simply be re-captured and forced back into slavery, perhaps under worse conditions than before? I don't know the answers to those sorts of questions. Yet, being in a position of forced immorality myself, I must look back on people of the past with a more analytical eye, rather than immediately dismissing their actions as the results of lazy conformity.
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