Vegetarianism
is morally obligatory for most humans because all sentient entities have at
least two basic rights: the right to life and the right to freedom from harm. These rights stem from sentient beings’
abilities to consciously value themselves and to suffer.
The
capacity to consciously value oneself, and one’s continued existence, is the
most basic and reliable source of value because it relies only on internal
factors. Externally generated valuing
also contributes to the moral relevance of a being (for example, while one can
normally kill a human or a dog who, due to some injury or disease, exists in a
permanently vegetative state without violating moral principles, one cannot
morally kill that individual if others place value on their life), but even in
its absence, internally generated value usually remains.
No valid reason to seriously doubt that many
non-human animals are conscious exists. Like
humans, non-humans animals adapt to different situations, develop and achieve
apparent goals, and visibly react to pain.
Humans possess no brain structures specific to their species which could
feasibly grant them, uniquely, consciousness.
Frey’s argument from language does not prohibit the possibility of
non-humans having beliefs, desires, and interests; possessing those things
makes language acquisition possible, not the other way around. Otherwise, human infants could never learn
language.
Since they have
consciousness, animals can value themselves and their own well-being, and they
seem to do so. They make efforts to
avoid pain and death while pursuing pleasure and health. As with consciousness, assuming that animals
act in these ways for a different set of reasons than humans defies common
sense. If animals do value themselves,
they have the rights to life and freedom from suffering.
Some advocates against
vegetarianism state that since humans have a right to pursue happiness, and eating
meat makes many humans happy, vegetarianism cannot be morally obligatory;
however, ‘meat’ animals’ right to life usually supersedes humans’ right to
pursue happiness in that particular way.
One can no more ethically derive enjoyment from a non-human animal’s
death than from murdering an innocent human.
Similarly, the right to freedom of choice and the right to continue
cultural traditions (which often include meat-eating) fail to override more
important rights. Most rights rely on
the prior existence of the right to life, and the right to life takes
precedence over them.
Depending on its manner of
implementation, a mass transition to vegetarianism could cause or contribute to
economic disaster for many countries. However, if a populace transitions gradually, it
does not have to do so. Even if it did, countries
would still be able to feed their citizens because plants are a much more
efficient source of food than animals.
The economic disaster would cause inconvenience but not mass death, and avoiding
inconvenience cannot justify eating animals.
Some people reject vegetarianism because
they believe plants and animals have the same rights. This view usually rests on one of two flawed
assumptions, however. The first states
that rights stem from the possession of life.
As I state in the above paragraphs, rights stem from the capacity to
value oneself. The second states that
plants are sentient. While plants, in
spite of the current total lack of evidence, might potentially possess
consciousness to some degree, animals almost certainly do; and since humans
must eat to survive, they should choose the lesser of two evils (or an evil and
a morally neutral action) and consume plants.
In the first paragraph of this
essay, I stated that most, not all, humans should adopt vegetarianism. If a human can only obtain certain nutrients
from meat due to some medical condition preventing absorption from other
sources, the right to self-defense allows them to consume meat. They may also maintain an omnivorous
lifestyle if they live in a location or situation where they can obtain no
other sources of necessary nutrition (as in many so-called ‘third world’
countries) or if they have allergies and intolerances – serious ones, not simply
inconveniences – which prohibit them from consuming other sources of nutrition.
I think that the arguments I
present above lead to the conclusion that vegetarianism is morally
obligatory. Furthermore, I think that
they extend, with only slight modification, to the conclusion that veganism is
morally obligatory. Only the right to
self-defense can mitigate these obligations, and that right applies in very few
cases.
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